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Abstract

ADAPTATION OF CUSTOMARY QUECHUA INDIGENOUS POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION IN THE FACE OF MODERN RESOURCE EXTRACTION: A
CASE STUDY IN THE APURIMAC REGION OF THE ANDES OF PERU
Yojana Miraya Oscco

This research focused on the forms and structure of customary political organization in
Quechua indigenous communities of the Peruvian Andes that extend from the villages to
their associated migrant communities in the capital. As the mining industry has been
expanding rapidly throughout the Andes in recent decades, describing the political
organization of these remote communities is a key aspect of their negotiation practices
with these external industries. This research was conducted utilizing grounded theory in a
comparative case-study format by analyzing two villages and their associated migrant
communities from the Andean District of Juan Espinoza Medrano. This research utilized
a mixed-methods approach by conducting over 70 semi-structured interviews and 186
household surveys. Results indicated that there exists a unique form of direct democracy
involving indigenous political organization in the villages and associated migrant
communities in the capital. Indigenous political organization is used for land
management, delegation of duties, relations between the associated migrant communities
and villages, and has had a direct effect on negotiations with the mining companies, even
extending to suspending operations at times. Correspondingly, this research also showed
ii

that mining operations have had a substantial effect on the customary political
organizations, community, and local economy by undermining the ability of villages and
migrant communities to effectively work together as before. This primary finding
suggests that there is a strong connection (politically, economically, socially and
culturally) between the associated migrant communities in Lima and their villages, and
there is a need for the villages to extend the geographic scale of negotiation for new
mining operations to the surrounding villages and their associated migrant communities
in order to avoid disagreements, which can be a detriment to all stakeholders involved.
Additionally, as the Peruvian government has shown limited interest in regulating
international mining companies, it is crucial to develop negotiation processes in the
future that include the associated migrant communities, the villages, and their forms of
indigenous political organization to make the decision-making process more transparent,
open, democratic, beneficial, and acceptable to all stakeholders. This would not only
strengthen the government's capacity for proper regulation, it would also reinforce the
importance of indigenous political organization and the sustainable communal land
management enjoyed by these communities for so many centuries.
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1
Introduction

This research focuses on Quechua indigenous communities of the Peruvian Andes
and their forms of political organization that extend from the villages (pueblos) to
migrant communities in the capital (locales) and dramatically affect local and national
environmental politics. Political organization in indigenous Quechua villages of the
Andes is a historic practice that exists to this day. This type of organization has governed
everything from law and order, to land, water, and other natural resource rights. Now, as
mining operations are expanding throughout the Andes, it is important to understand
whether and how these forms of political organization aid communities in negotiating
terms with mining companies. In addition, as many members of indigenous villages have
migrated to the capital Lima in the past three to four decades, these urban migrants play
important roles in modern indigenous political organization through their participation in
both national and local politics (Peattle, 1990). These strong political ties between rural
villages and urban migrant communities are important, because at this time mining
companies supported by the state are seeking access to communally held lands in the
Andes. How communities are organized politically will determine their ability to define
the terms of mining company access to their lands.
The purpose of this research was to understand what challenges and opportunities
indigenous communities face in order to organize politically, and specifically, what forms
of organization can, in the long term, support their self-determination and autonomy. This
research is a comparative case study of the political organizing experiences in two
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mountain communities, including their migrant members living in the Peruvian capital
Lima. The connection between urban and rural areas in the political organization of these
communities was a highly important part of the analysis for my research because some
villages are more connected with urban areas than others. I suspected this has some
influence on the extent of their political influence in mining politics regionally, and I
wanted to perform this case study comparison to see to what degree this is true. To this
end my research questions were as follows:
1. How are Quechua indigenous communities organized politically, specifically in
the district of Juan Espinoza Medrano?
2. Does indigenous organizing help communities to negotiate regional mining
agreements and control processes of development in their communities?
3. How does mining affect political organization?
4. How does political organizing between villages and migrant communities affect
community response to mining?
Chapter 1 begins by reviewing the literature on indigenous studies and debate
surrounding indigenous identity, customary indigenous political organization as it relates
to Quechua communities, common land management and tenure systems and their
relationship with migrant communities in the context of neoliberal economic policies.
Chapter 2 provides a brief background history of the Andes since colonial times focusing
on Quechua land tenure systems, and how the political organization of the indigenous
people and the struggles and resistance against the Spanish influenced indigenous land
management. Then, I geographically locate the District of Juan Espinoza Medrano and
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the villages of Calcauso and Mollebamba where this study took place. Finally, there is a
brief history and explanation of mining in Peru as it relates to the villages of this study.
In Chapter 3, I discuss the methods used to explore my research questions. I
applied a mixed method pattern of data collection including 70 interviews and 186
surveys, which I performed in the villages and in Lima in 2017. Questions focused on the
current mining industry, political organization, and indigenous identity. Chapter 4 covers
the quantitative and qualitative results of my data collection and analysis by focusing on
both thematic coding to analyze my interviews and a combination of SPSS and Google
Sheets Statistics to correlate my surveys with my interview data. In Chapter 5, I present
my results and discuss them with reference to the literature review. Finally, Chapter 6
details the limitations I encountered in the execution of this study, ideas and suggestions
for future research, and a conclusion. I hope this research will identify existing strategies
and provide new strategies of successful political organization that can help these
indigenous communities have an equal place at the negotiating table.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review

This literature review focuses on customary indigenous organization among the
Quechua and the challenges they face in the modern era of resource extraction. The main
themes discussed are indigenous studies, customary indigenous political organization,
and neoliberalism’s effects on mining operations. These three themes provide a
framework to explain in detail how they relate to this study including indigenous identity,
politicization of indigeneity, informal and formal organization, local autonomy, moral
economy, migrant communities, communal land management, and specific effects of the
former president of Peru, Alberto Fujimori’s economic policies. This review provides the
basis for my analysis of villages, their urban allies and networks that create the web of
power relations in these indigenous communities. In order to understand the political
organization of the indigenous people practiced through millennia in the current context,
it is important to acknowledge how the sense of community has been reproduced in urban
areas and how this relationship affects the decision-making process in the villages.
Much of the research concerning the Quechua focuses on their geographical
indigenous identity, social movements, and the effects of globalization and neoliberalism
on their traditional livelihoods (Radcliffe and Laurie, 2006; Contreras, 1987; Greene,
2006, De la Cadena, 2010, Laats, 2000; Bury, 2005, Arce, 2008, Lucero, 2009). In recent
decades there has been a renewed interest in these remote areas, especially with a focus
by anthropologists, sociologists, archaeologists, economists, and geographers on
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traditional Andean livelihoods as they existed before, during, and after colonization
(PACCPERU, 2011; Cordova, 2015; Yates, 2015). However, very little research has
focused on political organization in Quechua communities and how it relates to dynamic
connections between urban spaces and rural areas (PACCPERU, 2011). A review of
previous indigenous studies on the Quechua people helps to establish the uniqueness of
the present study.
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Indigenous Studies
The field of Indigenous Studies is broad and encompasses many peoples,
languages, cultures, time-periods, and modes of human living (Coates, 2003). Many
authors have defined and discussed key concepts underlying indigenous studies (Holm,
Pearson, and Chavis, 2003; Lee, 2006; Alfred and Corntassel, 2005; Minde, 2008;
Stoyanova, 2009). Here I will briefly review some of these definitions and theories and
explain why I used the peoplehood model to discuss indigeneity in this research.
Definition of ‘indigenous’
The definition of the term indigenous people has been a subject of major debate
between scholars (Coates, 2003). Defining indigenous identity is complex and important
because determining who ‘counts’ can affect the future political struggles of indigenous
people. International organizations such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, etc. have
defined “indigenousness” in a specific legal way with certain criteria while still allowing
for indigenous peoples to self-identify as indigenous or not (United Nations, 2004). To
some authors, these criteria are too narrow, because they marginalize groups that do not
fit the definition exactly, denying them fundamental protections and rights as indigenous
peoples (Minde, 2008; Stoyanova, 2009; Lee, 2006).
While the UN may have good intentions in their recognition of indigenous
peoples and their rights of self-determination, among other rights they recognize, this
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Western manner of top down legal definition can generate discomfort among indigenous
people (Alfred and Corntassel, 2005). Indigenous people are still part of modern nationstates and the world economy that is confronting massive economic, social and
environmental problems globally. Some indigenous studies scholars are trying to develop
a new holistic framework to approach the concept of indigeneity with more
inclusivity. Lee (2006) for example, described indigenous people using two definitions.
First, people who faced invasion and conquest from 1492 onwards. Second, a group of
indigenous people who claim to be indigenous in the modern world, but who have largely
been identified through shared agricultural social structures for a majority of their history.
These approaches emerging from anthropology attempt to explain the challenges of
indigenous people in current systems as indigenous people are increasing their visibility.

Most researchers relate indigenous identity to their land and history, but still there
are debates to find a holistic approach to determine indigenous identity. The problem
with definitions that place people in different categories is that they are static. It is
important to acknowledge that indigenous identities can change over time. One of the
integral ways to approach indigenous identity is based on the concept of peoplehood
developed by Holm, Pearson and Chavis, (2003). The authors argued that indigenous
identity consisted of four factors: land, sacred history, spiritual bond and language. They
expanded upon these elements to generate an explanation and foundation of
“peoplehood” through a “functional matrix” model which incorporated four factors: “the
language, sacred history, place territory, and ceremonial cycle” (Holm et al. 2003, p. 13).
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This concept can permit us to understand and revalidate many Quechuan communities as
indigenous through these criteria as they relate to South American indigeneity within the
wider academic debate on indigeneity in general. This can help bring more rights and
proper legal recognition to these communities as they are still largely classified by the
government as peasant communities. The debate about indigenous people and how
indigenous should be defined will continue in academic debates. However, as Lee (2006)
stated, “...the fact remains that, politically and socially, nationally and internationally, the
concept of indigenous has become a powerful tool for good. After centuries of
denigration, being recognized as indigenous has become an avenue for entitlement,
enfranchisement and empowerment” (Lee, 2006, p. 458).
Indigenous identity
This controversy over how indigenous should be defined is important for the
identity struggle of indigenous people in Latin America. For centuries, indigenous people
have struggled over the name campesino, “peasant”, and today there are new validations
of the term “indigenous” by state governments (Puente Valdivia, 2014; Yashar, 1998;
Tockman, 2016).
In the Andes, indigenous identity emerged in Inca times though scholars still
debate and speculate about the economic structure of Inca civilization and “…whether the
Inca were socialist or feudal, a welfare state or one with ‘patriarchal’ slavery…” (Murra,
1961, p. 47). Furthermore, some Peruvian authors debate how the Inca state was
organized before the Spanish conquest. Some of them claim the Incas used slavery but in
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a different form than was used in Europe and the Orient (Lumbreras, 1989; Baudin,
Woods & Goddard, 1961).
With the Spanish conquest the Inca civilization was destroyed and corrupted by
the Spanish as recorded by well-known indigenous author, Felipe Guaman Poma de
Ayala in his 1615 manuscript on the Andean civilization, the conquest by Spanish and the
abuses and exploitation of the indigenous people in colonial times. (Olson, & Casas,
2015; Guamán Poma de Ayala and Frye, 2006). Other authors have written about this
time and the effects on indigenous people in the Andes (e.g. De la Vega, 1985).
Indigenous identity has been under attack in Peru since the time of the Spanish
Conquest. Over time, many indigenous people migrated to the city in order to pursue
economic opportunities and escape from the difficult situations that existed in the
mountains such as tribute and mita (a colonial system that required Indians to work
forced labor such as working in the mines). Once indigenous people engaged in the
Spanish monetary economy, they were susceptible to changing their indigenous identity
just to be accepted in society (Henderson, 2013). This process of change of indigenous
people and their identity in modern times is well explained in the literature of indigenism,
specifically in how indigenous writers approached their own identity at the time
(Archibald, 2011; Coronado, 2014).
Indigenous identity in the Andes was heavily discriminated against during
Colonial times, but now this same identity is guaranteeing new rights, “poverty
alleviation and empowerment policies” in today’s modern politics (Radcliffe, 2006, p.
237). Indeed, the once demeaned, destroyed, and dejected indigenous cultures of the
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Americas seem to be on a positive upswing in terms of their identities, and this seems to
be having a positive effect on their political success and mobilization (Yashar, 1998).
Sociolinguistics of Quechuan Identity
It has been claimed that, “Indigenousness is an identity constructed, shaped and
lived in the politicized context of contemporary colonialism” (Alfred and Corntassel,
2005, p. 597). Further, Hornberger and Mckay (2010, p. 8) in explaining Kroskrity’s
(2004) fifth axiom of language ideologies stated that, “Language ideologies are major
determinants of social and cultural identities”. Taking both of these statements, one from
the field of Sociolinguistics and the other from the field of Indigenous Studies, the
tremendous influence of the term “indigenous” over conceptions of society becomes
clear. The term is not only constructed politically, its very use influences our languages
and ultimately our discourse in society. Moreover, our identities profoundly affect the
languages we speak, and the languages we speak help determine our identities. While the
concept of identity has been adopted readily by some indigenous people, especially
activist groups it is also, rejected by others., Thus the term identity has been a source of
continual discussion, concerning indigenous politics in Peru (Yashar, 1998; Oliver-Smith,
2012; Greene, 2006; De la Cadena, 2010; Strobele-Gregor, 1996; Garcia, 2003; Varese
1996; Radcliffe & Laurie 2006; Bebbington, Bebbington, Bury, Lingan, Muñoz, and
Scurrah 2008). Because of the centuries-long conflict involving the Quechua language
and identity, this investigation and analysis will draw from both of these fields of
research.
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Politicization of indigeneity
There seem to be to two major arguments over the term “indigenous” in current
literature. One says that this term is being reconstructed in a positive light that is uniting
many underprivileged people under a common banner and history, this in turn helps their
political organization and motivation. As Radcliffe and Laurie (2006) explained
concerning the connection between modern-day development and identity in the Andes,
“Andean development with identity provides a regionally specific example of the
broad culture and development paradigm. In these new approaches, indigenous
cultures once seen as an obstacle to social and economic development have become
central to poverty-alleviation and empowerment policies”. (Radcliffe & Laurie, 2006,
p. 237).
According to this line of argument, the once demeaned indigenous cultures of the
Americas have been in the process of reclaiming their identities, which has had a positive
effect on their political success and mobilization. However, this has not always been the
case. Other authors claim that as cultural identity was often forced on indigenous peoples,
even the modern label of “indigenous” or “aboriginal” by governments has politically
charged legal implications. According to Alfred and Corntassel, (2005)
...this identity is purely a state construction that is instrumental to the state’s
attempt to gradually subsume Indigenous existences into its own constitutional
system and body politic...‘aboriginalism’ is a legal, political and cultural
discourse designed to serve an agenda of silent surrender to an inherently unjust
relation at the root of the colonial state itself (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005, p. 598).
The terms have been constructed and used by governments in an effort to create
an exclusionary dichotomy between indigenous and non-indigenous. This, of course, has
significant political implications, both for how indigenous people are perceived by nonindigenous citizens, and for how indigenous people perceive themselves.
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Peasant or indigenous
Indigenous identity has been altered in different countries in Latin America by
changing indios to “peasants” (Burt & Mauceri, 2014; Bordais, 2016; Yashar, 1998). As
mentioned in chapter 2, agrarian reforms in Peru that have been taking place since the
arrival of the Spanish have influenced the identities of the indigenous inhabitants of these
areas dramatically. Particularly since the reforms of the Velasco government in 1967, as
Yashar (1998) explained, “...these reforms obliged Indians to define themselves as
peasants, particularly if they hoped to gain access to state resources. Official political
discourse promoted assimilation into mestizo culture and extended resources to rural
citizens insofar as they identified and organized as peasants” (Yashar, 1998, p. 33).
When Velasco’s land reforms came, many indios became campesinos under the
law in order to receive certain economic and political benefits from the State such as land
ownership and voting rights (Yashar, 1998). Thus, this change of identity was directly
linked to political opportunity and social mobility. Interestingly, this identity change has
now almost been reversed, especially by indigenous leaders who are attempting to
reclaim an identity that was self-detrimental for so long, and turn it into something that
provides more rights, protection, and opportunities (Canessa, 2006). As communities
continue to organize themselves around legal terminology that serves their best interest,
language and identity are continuing to play a major role in Quechua political
organization. This is evidenced by the many communities that still organize in the
indigenous language allowing them the recognition of their identity.
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Customary Indigenous Political Organization
Informal and formal organizations
The social structure of Quechua communities in Peru has a large impact on their
forms of political organization and eventual social movements. As mentioned previously,
the social structure of these communities includes the family, the village (pueblo), and
the local (the community of village migrants that live in the capital). These structures
constitute what Pejovich (1999) calls “informal institutions”, which are different from
state-approved “formal institutions” like municipalities and government agencies.
The distinction between informal and formal political organization in rural communities
is important. As Pejovich (1999) states, “Some communities are dominated by informal
rules. We call them “traditional” communities” (Pejovich, 1999, p. 172). Furthermore,
Helmke and Levitsky (2004), give a great working definition for both formal and
informal institutions. They see, “...informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually
unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned
channels. By contrast, formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created,
communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official” (Helmke &
Levitsky, 2004, p. 727).
These definitions are further elaborated on by Helmke and Levitsky (2004) who
divide the various informal institutions into four categories based on how much their
desired outcomes align with the formal institutions that exist in that community. Using
these four categories it is possible to distinguish the different types of political
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organization in each community. The four categories of informal political organization
are shown below in Figure 5.
As is visible, the institutions are separated into those that are “divergent” and
those that are ”convergent” where the latter is more aligned with government interests
and the former is more against government interests. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) further
separate these informal institutions into those that are operating under an “effective” or
“ineffective” government as this will affect how the informal institution operates. Thus, a
“competing” informal institution would be operating in a climate of little government
effectiveness and a divergence of political thought between the local people and the
government. This could be seen as a protest, resistance, or even revolutionary movement
or organization. An “accommodating” informal institution would be one that is being
forced to capitulate their autonomy to a different but effective government. The
community still has differing views from the government though they now must find a
way to work with the government to preserve their own interests. A “substitutive”
informal institution is one that is aligned with the government interests though they are
operating under an ineffective government, thus they often act as substitutes for the
government by providing basic services or organization. Finally, there are
“complementary” informal institutions that operate under an effective government and
share the government's plan of direction, this means they help the government advance
their goals within the local community.

15
Table 1: Helmke and Levitsky (2004)
Outcomes
Convergent
Divergent

Effective formal institutions
Complementary
Accommodating

Ineffective formal institutions
Substitutive
Competing

These definitions help relate to my term of political organization in those two
communities, pueblos and locales, as different types of informal organizations according
to how they are able, or unable, to empower communities in relation to their response to
outside economic actors (e.g. Nonprofit organizations, mining industry, state regulations,
etc.). Pejovich (1999) developed a theory called the interaction thesis, which states that as
economic opportunities enter new areas, the acceptance of those activities by the informal
and formal institutions in society affects the ability of that industry to develop and
survive (Pejovich, 1999, p. 171). This theory will help provide a framework to test the
economic viability of the different forms of political organization that exist in these two
communities.
Francis Cleaver (2001) developed these arguments further with an idea he called
“bricolage”1. Cleaver suggested that instead of having rigid denominations of groups
such as those suggested by Pejovich (1999) it would be better to see these categories as
holistic, multi-faceted, and interchangeably working together. Cleaver (2001) argued that
many communities, especially indigenous peasant communities due to their unique

“Bricolage consists of the adaptive processes in which people inscribe configurations of rules, traditions,
norms and relationships with meaning and authority. In so doing they modify old arrangements and invent
new ones but innovations are always linked authoritatively to acceptable ways of doing things” (De Koning
and Cleaver, 2012, p. 4)
1
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context, often exhibit multiple aspects of these classical political descriptions. Cleaver
specifically stated that, “...this is (a) false dichotomy and that local resource-use practices
and management arrangements are likely to be a complex blend of formal and informal,
traditional and modern” (Cleaver, 2001, p. 29). This makes the idea of bricolage an
excellent complement to those of Pejovich (1999).
Furthermore, Ostrom (1990; 2008) in analyzing common pool resource (CPR)
management specifically focused on institutional analysis of the context of resource
management as communities responded to their environment based on their own
institutions and rules. She claimed that these unique rules created by successfully
managed CPRs work in some places, but not necessary in other places (Ostrom, 2008).
The idea of peoplehood (Holmes et al., 2003) discussed above helps to bring into focus
the value of these different roles and institutions for the indigenous communities that are
the focus of this research. This study attempted to address this complex network of
institutions.
Local autonomy and self-determination
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People considers
indigenous people as autonomous nations with self-determination. Article 4 states that,
“Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self- determination, have the right to
autonomy or self-government in the matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.” (United Nations,
2007, p. 4).
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The degree of local autonomy that a region receives is determined by many
factors and can have various outcomes, both positive and negative. Some of the negative
aspects of local autonomy can be local abuses or corruption that cannot be controlled by
the central government. It can also include the local ambitions that some community
members may have, causing deep-seated competition and rivalry among families.
Moreover, increased local autonomy can cause friction between the national and local
governments, which may slow development of infrastructure, education, police, and other
state institutions (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). However, local autonomy is also a vital
concern for many of these communities as they have organized their own forms of local
governments for many centuries.
Forms of local autonomy include democratic elections of local authorities,
communal decisions, and a shared understanding/expectation that all community
members have a responsibility to serve the community without any salary (Mainwaring,
& Shugart, 1997). The administration and development of local autonomy historically
has had a huge impact on communities, because it allowed everyone to participate and
serve the communities based in their own territory. As Laats (2000) explains, “With
respect to self-government, it seems that the peasants form a micro political unit that
corresponds with the will of the majority of their inhabitants” (Laats, 2000, p. 11). In this
sense, the inhabitants of these communities organize themselves to defend and advance
their own interests making local autonomy a crucial aspect of their political bargaining
power. One aspect of the local autonomy exercised by these communities is the political,
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economic, and sociocultural connection that is maintained with the migrants from each
village that go to work or study in another city, mainly Lima.
Migrant Communities
The various organizations of migrants in Lima (Asociacion de Comunidades
Migrantes) come from all provinces of Peru and play an important role in creating
cultural spaces in the urban areas of the city. They provide a much needed recreational
outlet in addition to their function as a political organization which aims at being an
intermediary between the migrants and the often complicated institutional bureaucracy
(Golte, & Adams, 1987). As Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez (2008) added that,
“...social capital increases the likelihood that a collaborative effort will succeed (Wagner
& Fernandez-Gimenez, 2008, p. 325). Thus, the collaboration between individuals and
families in the rural villages of Peru may indeed have a large effect on the social capital
they bring with them to Lima as migrant communities.
Urban migration in Peru started in the 1940s and increased in the 1980s due to the
terrorist movement of the Shining Path. This decade saw a rise in the migration from
rural areas to the city where mostly indigenous people migrated and were exposed to
discrimination and abuse. In many cases this helped cause the loss of their ethnic identity
(Heredia, 2016; Starn, 1992; Burt & Mauceri, 2014). Migrant communities coming from
rural areas to the city face many challenges in adapting to the capital (Kirk, 1991; Starn,
1992). As individuals, migrants from the Andes are extremely marginalized. The
adaptation process also presented new challenges and problems for the migrants, such as
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lack of basic services, poverty, marginalization, racism, etc. (Solari & Jorge,
2008). Migrant communities, for example, usually arrived on the periphery of Lima and
were known as “invaders”. This word refers to the invasion, or land claimed for
settlement by many individuals at once. (Peattle, 1990) describes for example, “A group
of between 80 and 100 families [that] decided to organize a land invasion. They had
already organized an invasion two years previously, but eventually they had been
removed by the police” (Peattle, 1990, p.21).
With such extreme poverty and discrimination, many migrants have difficulty
finding jobs that pay a decent wage. Many migrant women are pressured to work as
housekeepers facing extreme racism, discrimination, and even slavery-like conditions
working in houses without much pay, while migrant men are often exploited on
construction job sites, as cart-carriers, janitors, and other types of manual laborers (La
Prensa, 2015). These occupations, especially housekeeping, only permit one day of rest
per week, on Sunday.
Thus, Sunday is an important day for these communities as everyone comes from
all their jobs and other locations in the city to the locale to have meetings, eat food, enjoy
cultural activities, and sports events. Sunday is a day where many of these individuals
finally feel empowered. After being in a state of marginalization all week, in the locales
they can speak with friends in their own dialects, feel like an equal, make political
decisions about their communities and villages, and participate in meaningful cultural
activities helping maintain a connection with their origins. According to Agnew, Shelley,
& Pringle, (2003)“…there are three elements of place: locale, or place as setting for
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social interaction; location, or place located in geographical space; and sense of place, or
attachment between people and place” (Agnew, Shelley, & Pringle, 2003, p. 605-606).
This makes locations such as the locale very important for communities,
especially ones that are as marginalized and closely-tied together as the migrant
communities of Lima. Providing a space for consistent and effective political
organization coupled with an area for cultural festivities, sports and more helps create a
“locale” with enormous political and economic potential based primarily on “social
capital”.
Communal-based Land Management
Communal land management consists of communities governing, managing, and
utilizing their lands based on agreed communal need. It exists and has existed for many
dozens of centuries. In order to discuss the ideas surrounding communal-based land
management it is necessary to define a few concepts that are used often in this field of
study so I can establish how it will relate to the framework of this thesis. “‘Enclosure’
refers to the process of commodifying new aspects of human life in a way that catalyzes
broader transformation in communities and social relations. Historically, the term
referred to the privatization of common village lands” (De Angelis, 2004 as cited in
Grandia, 2012, p. 4). According to Grandia (2012) the first phase of ‘enclosure’ is usually
the physical and legal takeover of land through land titling then the second phase is the
ultimate cultural and social acceptance of such practices which are antithetical to village
commons. Within these two phases Grandia (2012) claims that the first one is easier to
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stop directly, while the second one is more subtle and difficult to detect and resist. The
identification of the phase that the communities of this study find themselves in is
important because it will help predict the future stages of enclosure they are likely to
witness as well as provide concrete ways to resist the negative effects of such changes.
Part of the first phase that Grandia (2012) identifies includes a change in the land
tenure system through a process of privatization. This privatization can take place legally,
or through other means, and has the effect of removing lands that were once part of the
commons, usable by all based on land management practices, and placing them in the
hands of private individuals. This means that land tenure, or who inherits land and how,
is a very important gauge as to whether or not land is held in common or privately.
Common pool resources and land tenure
According to Elinor Ostrom (2008), communities develop institutions to manage
common pool resources (CPR). Her research indicates that successful CPR systems’
institutions commonly share eight similar “design principles” (Ostrom, 2008, p. 28).
These eight characteristics include: (1) defining clear group boundaries, (2) matching
rules governing use of common goods to local needs and conditions, (3) ensuring that
those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules, (4) making sure the
rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside authorities, (5)
developing a system, carried out by community members, for monitoring members’
behavior, (6) using graduated sanctions for rule violators, (7) providing accessible, lowcost means for dispute resolution, and (8) building responsibility for governing the
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common resource in nested tiers from the lowest level up to the entire interconnected
system (Ostrom, 2008 p.28). The question of who helps create and maintain the
institutions that members live by and how they are enforced is thus of major importance
for CPR. For this investigation the primary characteristics that were of major importance
for discussion purposes were the first seven design principles.
According to Ostrom (2008), the effectiveness and robustness of institutions is
increased where extensive norms have developed over time as a collective choice. By
pointing to various examples of CPR throughout the world, mostly fisheries, she
dismissed the idea that people always act as selfish individuals or that all selfish decisions
are inherently rational (Ostrom, 2008). Thus, even in areas such as the villages of this
study, people often have the use of and responsibility for shifting plots of land while
maintaining only small amounts of what would be considered “private” property in that it
can be legally titled.
Loss of the moral economy, marginalization, and primitive accumulation
As neoliberalism is largely concerned with economics it is important to review the
literature concerning traditional economics in Quechua communities. The concept of the
“moral economy” is very important for understanding Quechua societies because it has
helped govern and shape the development and function of markets as well as political
organization. The moral economy concept was originally put forward by James Scott
(1976) and is described by Paul Robbins (2012) as “...social systems of mutual assistance
and tolerable exploitation...these systems are extended to shared land and labor as well as
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to...certain forms of redistributive rent, where a proportion of their harvest is lost in
sharecropping and taxation” (Robbins, 2012, p. 62). These forms of communal
organization have helped create a favorable climate for political organization.
Communities are accustomed to local political organization because they know each
other intimately, work together on a regular basis, and largely administer their villages on
their own. This has been a tremendous benefit for modern communities that are
confronting issues of marginalization, “primitive accumulation”, and the environmental
conflicts related to mining operations.
The processes of primitive accumulation and marginalization results in a loss of
moral economy, a critical component of traditional rural societies. Jim Glassman (2006)
tells us that, “Primitive accumulation is for Marx, first and foremost, the ‘historical
process of divorcing the producer from the means of productions’, transforming, ‘the
social means of subsistence and of production into capital and immediate producers into
wage laborers’ (Glassman, 2006, p. 610). According to Glassman (2006), primitive
accumulation can occur in many ways including “forcible usurpation of common
property”, “enclosures of the commons”, and “proletarianization”. All of these forces are
at work in the communities directly and indirectly affected by mining operations,
including the Quechua community. Above all, processes of primitive accumulation not
only “divorce the producer from the means of production” as Marx says, but also serve to
divorce the producer from the morals of production. Indeed, without risk of being too
romantic, this loss of morals, and the beginning of the “race to the bottom” is starting to
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be noticed on a global scale as people become more conscious of corporate and
governmental abuses against poor and marginalized people.
According to Robbins (2012), marginalization can occur in a society when
“Otherwise environmentally innocuous production systems undergo transition to
overexploitation of natural resources on which they depend as a response to state
development intervention and/or increasing integration in regional and global markets”
(Robbins 2012, p. 21). This marginalization is directly connected to a change in
economic modes of production and a change of the economic mentality of a people.
The economic and social changes that come because of these changes often create
environmental conflicts, or as Robbins explains:
...increasing scarcities produced through resource enclosure or appropriation by
state authorities, private firms, or social elites accelerate conflict between groups
(gender, class, or ethnicity). Similarly, environmental problems become
“politicized” when local groups (gender, class, or ethnicity) secure control of
collective resources at the expense of others by leveraging management
interventions by development authorities, state agents, or private firms (Robbins,
2012, p. 200).
This description encompasses many of the economic processes that have been at work in
Quechua communities since the arrival of the mining industry in Peru in Spanish colonial
times. In the district of this study, Juan Espinoza Medrano (JEM), issues of
marginalization, primitive accumulation, and environmental conflict all combine to make
this region a candidate for a study on the effects of neoliberalism on indigenous political
organization, especially that surrounding the development of the mining industry.
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Neoliberalism’s Effects on Mining Operations
Economic neoliberalism and mining
Another major debate that has been taking place across many relevant disciplines
(e.g. political science, ecology, environmentalism, business, geography), is the discussion
of neoliberalism and its potential effects on mining ventures (Bury, 2005; Arce, 2008;
Lucero, 2009; Holden & Jacobson, 2007). First, a distinction should be made here
between “globalization” and “neoliberalism”, as the two terms are often used
interchangeably. For the purpose of this study, globalization is the process of a global
movement of people, ideas, products, information, and money with many cultural,
economic, social, political, and historical factors (Haarstad & Floysand, 2007).
Neoliberalism is an economic and political ideology that is concerned with deregulating
market controls worldwide and decreasing the amount of government welfare support for
social services2 (Jessop, 2002). As Haarstad and Floysand (2007) explicitly state, we
should not risk
...making the assumption that globalization is in itself corporate control and
equating globalization with neoliberal economic ideology, and falling into a
binary polemic over the desirability or destructiveness of globalization. We argue
that the view of globalization as inherently empowering multinational
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As a new economic project oriented to new conditions, neoliberalism calls for: the liberalization and
deregulation of economic transactions, not only within national borders but also—and more importantly—
across these borders; the privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-provided services; the use of
market proxies in the residual public sector; and the treatment of public welfare spending as a cost of
international production, rather than as a source of domestic demand. As a political project, it seeks to roll
back “normal” (or routine) forms of state intervention associated with the mixed economy and the
Keynesian welfare national state (or analogous forms of intervention in the developmental state or socialist
plan state) as well as the “exceptional” (or crisis-induced) forms of intervention aimed at managing,
displacing, or deferring crises in and/or of accumulation regimes and their modes of regulation in Atlantic
Fordism, East Asia, and elsewhere (Jessop, 2002, p. 454).
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corporations ignores the more complex restructuring of social, political, and
economic processes (Haarstad a& Floysand, 2007, p. 290)
Indeed, Haarstad and Floysand (2007) argue that the forces of globalization (i.e.
the spread of new ideas, technology, trade, and culture worldwide) could potentially be
highly beneficial for social movements, political organization, and even local autonomy.
This is in contrast to those who see globalization as a process of centralization of power.
This ongoing debate is interesting and this case study of villages and migrant
communities in the Andes should provide more information about the effects of
neoliberalism on mining operations.
Since the 1990’s, mining operations worldwide have largely benefited from the
expansion of neoliberal policies (Jessop, 2002; Bury, 2005; Arce, 2008; Lucero, 2009;
Budds & Hinojosa, 2012). These policies have allowed for more ready access to lands
across the world, many of which are lands of low-income peasants, often held
communally, who have few options to resist when a large mining corporation,
government agencies, and social workers arrive in these areas to convince them to permit
the development of the mine (Jessop, 2002). This has caused different forms of
acceptance and resistance to mining throughout the world (Bebbington et al. 2008;
Jessop, 2002).
Neoliberalism's effects on mining under Fujimori in the Peruvian Andes
The problems associated with the neoliberal expansion of Fujimori during the
1990’s have been well documented and discussed (Bury, 2005; Arce, 2008; Lucero,
2009; Williams, 2012); however, it is important to detail a few of these issues. The
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neoliberal economic politics of the Fujimori regime permitted the entrance of the mining
industry into the Andes using the discourse that the mining industry would bring
development to these poor regions of Peru. However, as a result of many of these
reforms, called Fujishock or “shock therapy” by Fujimori’s government, the poorest
people of Peru often suffered worst (Bury, 2005). As Bury explains, “The results of
Fujimori's reforms have been significant. The Peruvian economy is now dominated by
the private sector, regulated by market forces, and intricately linked to the global
economy” (Bury, 2005, p. 223). Consequently, there have been increases in economic
activity, foreign investment, and international exports. However, Bury maintains that
many of the poorest in Peru have benefitted very little. “Overall, despite some advances
in economic growth and increasingly positive assessments of macroeconomic growth
rates in the country, poverty rates have either declined very little or have actually
increased during the past decade” (Bury, 2005, p. 223). Aside from this, many of the
approaches used by mining companies in these regions have caused division and social
conflict in the communities where they operate. As a result, international economic
pressure has had a strong impact on the changes to the economic system in Peru by
allowing the entrance of international corporations with new regulations since the 1990’s
in order to promote more investment. Furthermore, the environment and traditional
livelihood of peasant indigenous communities have been jeopardized throughout the
Andes due to these changes, which have included the lack of control of the laws and
operational normativity by the centralized government and have often created
vulnerability in these communities (Arellano, 2008; Arce et al., 2009).
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A study by Zoe Williams (2012) into the prevalence of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) tactics by mining companies in Peru revealed that CSR campaigns
are often used to obtain initial approval of the mining operations by the community.
Williams (2012) discovered that the more organized a community was, the better they
were able to make demands on the mining company regarding their CSR. This
organization is important because during moments of contention between the mine and
the communities in this study, Williams (2012) found that, “…CSR was used to defuse
conflict without adequately addressing its underlying causes… [And] has functioned to
buy off communities (or community leadership)” (Williams, 2012, p. 87-88). This is a
concern that this study attempted to address by highlighting and examining the
community conflicts that have arisen in the villages and locales of this study since the
entrance of the mining companies.
There are many examples of the effects of mining throughout Peru, but
specifically the Province of Apurimac has the highest percentage of this investment
(33%) and is simultaneously one of the country’s poorest regions (Sosa, Boelens &
Zwarteveen, 2017). One well-known case in Tambogrande demonstrates not only some
common themes found in most mining areas throughout Peru, but it also provides this
research with a critical question to answer about political organization and the
“...geographical scale for the voting process” that should be instituted in communities
before mining is accepted (Muradian, et al. 2003, p. 775).
In Tambogrande, Peru the Canadian mining company Manhattan Minerals Corp.
encountered a very big problem with their operation and investment in the year 2001.
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Due to large public opposition (85%) to the mine because of a lack of consultation and
consensus-building, a large local protest movement had reached its climax with a group
of people vandalizing some mining equipment. One of the protest leaders, Godo Fredo
Garcı´a Baca, was assassinated not long after by unknown gunmen in return. Eventually
the Peruvian government and various other NGOs, like CONACAMI (National
Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining), and Oxfam got involved
in the conflict to try and form a resolution (Muradian, Martinez-Alier & Correa., 2003).
Muradian et al. (2003) make the case that in order to avoid these types of conflicts in the
future mining companies must consult with local communities in a participatory fashion.
Consulting in a participatory fashion includes open discussion in community
assemblies and allowing a public referendum on the issue of mining by the people whose
land and livelihoods will be affected. The question that Muradian et al. (2003) then pose
for future research is: what should the geographical scale of the voting process be? In this
thesis, I have tried to address some of the issues around the participation of migrant
communities and surrounding villages in the consultation and referendum process of the
mining companies in JEM. This debate over the benefits versus the negative
consequences of neoliberalizing economies, mining opportunities, and a globalized
culture will continue for the foreseeable future. The profound implications and role of
globalization and neoliberalism in the Quechua political organization are important for
understanding their effect on mining politics and on the livelihoods of the people in these
communities.
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As this literature review indicates, information is lacking about the relationship
between migrant communities and their home communities, how they are politically
organized and how they have responded to outside influences seeking to extract
resources. This research illuminates the relationship between two mountain communities
and their urban migrant counterparts and their differential responses to overtures from
mining companies. It addresses the following research questions:
1. How are Quechua indigenous communities organized politically, specifically in
the district of Juan Espinoza Medrano, Apurimac?
2. How does mining affect political organization?
3. How does political organizing between villages and migrant communities affect
community response to mining?
4.

Does customary indigenous organizing help communities to negotiate regional
mining agreements and control processes of development in their communities?

31
Chapter 2: Background and Context

The Andes in South America is the longest continental mountain range in the
world. This has caused great geographical challenges for both the Incan Empire which
expanded to the modern countries of Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina
and for all subsequent societies. This study focuses on communities that live in the
mountains of the province of Apurimac, which means "where the gods speak" in the
Quechua language. It is located on the eastern slope of the Cordillera de los Andes with
the highest altitude of 3,952 m (12,966 ft). The ancient society in this area was adapted to
this physical environment and they created innovative economic, political, and social
connections between the jungle, the coast and the mountains of Peru.

Andean History
Colonial times
In colonial times, though these communities maintained some of their own local
political organization, they suffered many forms of colonial oppression including “forced
labor” in the mines (Frye, 2006, p. viii). In these areas there are still places where mining
has existed since the Spanish ruled, where indigenous people were exploited and never
received any payment, such as the silver mine at Potosi (Frye, 2006). There is also
evidence of various forms of abuse and discrimination against indigenous people such as
forced labor, unjust punishment, cruel treatments, exploitation, and racism (Poma de
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Ayala, 1988). These types of discrimination were strongly embedded in the society of
this time and many prejudices have continued until today due to this factor.
According to Laats, (2000) who did a prolonged study of the communal lands of
Cusco, there is a long history of policies under which indigenous people had limited
participation in decisions made about the autonomy of their own lands. This
discrimination can be explained through different stages of the history of land
management in Peru. In the colonial period, the process of “reduction” of the Indians was
introduced where small towns were created in order to facilitate the work of
evangelization. In this process the Spanish conferred the land to communities with two
ways of exploitation: collective and individual, in order to collect taxes for the corona
(Spanish crown). By the 19th century, Peru gained independence under Simon Bolivar
who tried to eliminate many of the forms of colonialism in existence at that time by
changing the system of communal land to private land, expecting that that would bring
progress. This opportunity was taken advantage of by the elite classes of huge
landowners because they were in a better financial position to benefit from the
privatization of land (Laats, 2000). This would eventually cause its own problems of land
management that Velasco’s government would attempted to reform in the 20th century,
explained in more detail below.
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The history of agrarian reform.
After the Constitution of 1920, the Peruvian state recognized the existence of
indigenous communities into the national legal order and in 1933 the separate legal
existence of the indigenous communities expired. In 1969, President Velasco initiated the
agrarian reform and landowners become agrarian cooperatives and peasant communities,
ignoring the social and cultural aspects of the communities, which were indigenous. The
Constitution of 1979, the General Law on Peasant Communities 24656 and the Law of
Demarcation and Titling of Communal Territory 24657 among others, regulated the
legality, function, rights, and obligations of the communities (Laats, 2000).
Eventually the term indio, created in colonial times, would be replaced with
campesino (peasant) to align with the political structure of the Velasco government and
his Agrarian Reform Program. According to Lourdes Bordais (2016), “The Agrarian
Reform represents the first step towards a more just society in terms of equal
opportunities and material security for those that demand it” (Bordais, 2016, p. 143).
Before this reform, indigenous people were largely dependent servants working on
regimens of latifundios, or large agricultural estates under Spanish landowners. On these
latifundios indigenous people were still known, and degraded, as indios. When Velasco’s
land reforms came, many indios became campesinos under the law in order to receive
certain economic and political benefits from the state such as land ownership and voting
rights (Yashar, 1998). Thus, this change of identity was directly linked to political
opportunity and social mobility, and its effects can be felt until this day.
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While these reforms were passed under Velasco’s government, the real work of
implementation was done by the government of Belaunde during the early 1980’s. In
1982 the government expanded the agrarian reform and made the process more effective
and attainable for average peasants (Laats, 2000). Finally, in 1993 a new constitution
defined some of these lands as privately held (e.g. urban centers, house plots, nearby
family fields) and some of these lands as communally held (e.g. road/waterways,
communal agricultural land, pastoral land). This has encouraged some people from some
communities to sell their land (Laats, 2000). Peru still maintains communal land. In
today's context the titling of communal land is not complete and there are still some
communities without official land titles (SICCAM, 2016; CEPES IBC, 2016).
History of the political organization in Juan Espinoza Medrano
The district of Juan Espinoza Medrano is one of the seven districts of the Province
of Antabamba located in the department of Apurimac. According to the National Institute
of Statistics and Information (INEI) (2007), the population of this district is
approximately 1,975 inhabitants. This district contains six towns (Santiago, Santa Rosa,
Calcauso, Vito, Silco and Mollebamba). Recently, there have been some conflicts
between these towns since mining companies began working in Mollebamba.
In the 1980s the terrorist group the Shining Path (sendero luminoso) created a
large war and chaos in many parts of rural Peru. The Shining Path was a communist
movement that started in the Andes with the objective of taking political power. To this
end, they used the indigenous people of the mountains and jungles as allies to enforce
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their own political visions on the subject population. At the same time, the Peruvian
military, which was sent to fight and kill the terrorists, also treated these same
populations with abusive contempt when they arrived in towns that had been taken over
by the Shining Path (Burt, 2006). There are many stories of abuses on both sides of this
conflict that have had strong effect on the indigenous people’s way of thinking, many of
them now have little trust for revolutionary movements or strong governments (Méndez,
& Chipoco, 1988).
The Shining Path was strongly against any kind of organization that was working
with the formal political structure of the government during this time, which diminished
much of the local political organization. At the same time there was extensive outmigration towards the cities in search of better options. According to my surveys and
interviews, the weakening of the customary indigenous political organization during the
1980’s and 1990’s was partly due to the Shining Path insurgency. In these times they did
not have a village president as this was not permitted, instead they had representatives
called delegates (delegados) that worked as a type of authority for almost one year at a
time. Many people left their villages in order to survive, and many authorities left the
villages as well because nobody wanted to assume power due to the fear that the Shining
Path might kill them.
Migrant people from different regions that were affected by this socio-political
conflict arrived in the cities and started new lives on the periphery of Peru’s cities, though
mainly in the capital Lima. Here they lived in the most basic of conditions and they
created new livelihoods.

36
Unlike refugees who flee across borders, Peru’s internally displaced people ...go
uncounted and unrecognized, unwanted reminders of a war most Peruvians would
like to forget... many of them Quechua-speaking peasants suddenly forced to
abandon their small farms to confront the racism, loneliness, and economic
desperation of life in an urban shantytown (Kirk, 1991, p. 5).
Later, they would establish associations, commercial conglomerates, organizations, clubs,
etc. reproducing their communities throughout the city. Their experiences are detailed
below.

Geo-location of this Research
The populations for the basis of this study all come originally from the District of
Juan Espinoza Medrano (JEM), which is located in the province of Antabamba,
Apurímac at an elevation of 10872.7ft. JEM was officially recognized as a District with
its capital of Mollebamba in 1942 with the towns of Calcauso, Silco and Vito within its
limits3. Recently, in 2009 the community of Santa Rosa also joined the District of JEM
(PACC PERU, 2011).

3

Latitude (lat): 14.0505 ° 45 ' 23.94179''S

Longitude (lon): 73.0877 ° 0 ' 49.56057''W
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Figure 1: Map of Peru, (Herminia. H, 2013)
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Figure 2- District of Juan Espinoza Medrano in the State of Apurimac (PACC PERU,
2011)
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Calcauso (Ccalccauso in Quechua, pronounced Khalkhauso)
According to public registers, the community of ‘Calcauso’ is located in the
district of JEM province of Antabamba, Apurímac at an elevation of 12122.7ft,4 and was
officially recognized by Supreme Resolution on the 6 of April 1953. Its area consists of
the central township and surrounding lands amounting to a total of 934.30mi² (Archival
Document from Calcauso, 1987).

4

Latitude (lat): 14 ° 27 '0"S

Longitude (lon): 72°55'0"W
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Figure 3 – Calcauso (Adrian Ccarapa, 2017)
Mollebamba (Mollepata in native language)
Mollebamba is the capital of the district of JEM, province of Antabamba, region of
Apurimac located in the south of Peru located at 10498.69 feet above sea-level and
encompassing an area of 433.82mi².5 The community of Mollebamba was first
recognized in 1940 and obtained legal status on the 14 of November 1956 under their

5

Latitude (lat): 14°25'17"S

Longitude (lon): 72°54'43"W
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first mayor Florentino Suarez Rea and was registered in the Property Register of Peasant
Communities (Cordova, 2015).

Figure 4 – Mollebamba (Photo of Mollebamba from Mapito.net circa 2012)
Andean Geography
According to the late Peruvian geographer Javier Pulgar Vidal (1981), Peru can be
divided into seven natural regions, as seen in Figure 5, based on their altitude and climate.
The District of JEM is located in the region of Quechua, while the migrant population of
this study are located in the capital and therefore live in the Chala region of Peru.
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Figure 5 - Eight Regions of Peru (Vidal, 1981).
This diverse geography has played an important role for remote communities as it
has enabled them to develop their own forms of autonomous political organization.
Throughout history, the geography encouraged these remote communities to make strong
connections both locally and with other regions of Peru in order to barter for regional
products and crops (Contreras, 1987). Traveling merchants have conducted this regional
trade since Inca times and were known as arrieros or muleteers. The arrieros not only
traded goods, they were essential in the sharing of ideas. They brought news, new ideas,
and inventions from other regions. Although these muleteers were largely indigenous
during colonial times and before, according to Jesus Contreras, “...the muleteers played
just as key of a role in politics” (Contreras, 1987, p. 50). As many muleteers were
entrusted with important cargo loads and documents, they often had some knowledge of
laws, finance, as well as contracts, and could thus help inform and direct their
communities so they could achieve benefits or due rights from the State. The economy in
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this area was based on barter and exchange products through the arrieros who have aided
and enabled much of these communities’ ability to successfully organize politically.
These different geographical regions of Peru were known as Tahuantinsuyo
during the times of the Inca Empires, which means in Quechua ‘division in four regions’,
thus this type of geographical division has a long history in Peru. In the Inca times, a tribe
emerged called the Chancas, an ethnic group from Apurimac, which along with the
Huancas from Junin, formed the principal enemy of the Inca empire before the Spanish
arrived. In the time of the invasion of the Spanish, this ethnic group was allied with the
Spanish (D'Altroy, 1987). According to Silverman (2003):
How the Incas arose and came to conquer and administer this extraordinarily
diverse region is one of the driving questions of Andean archaeology… in Inca
myth, at least, the story begins with the Inca's surprise victory over an invading
Chanca army, their mortal enemies at the dawn of the empire. The historicity and
nature of Chanca society is a topic of major importance (p. 720).
The residents of the villages and locales that this study focuses on are descendants of the
chancas, so understanding a little bit about their history is important for context.
Equally, the effects of the Spanish conquest of this vast Inca Empire are also
important to briefly consider. According to (Belknap and Sandweiss, 2014, p. 1), because
of the Spanish, “...conquest of the vast Inca Empire, they initiated profound changes in
the culture, language, technology, economics, and demography of western South
America”. The invasion of the Spanish dramatically affected the culture and political
organization of the former Empire.
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Migrant Communities
The locales or associations of migrant communities in Peru are well known as
associations that began to appear during the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s.
They formed social and cultural spaces for migrants coming from the countryside to the
city (Sevillano, 2016). This type of association between space and place plays an
important role in the urban areas of Peru. Specifically, Agnew’s (1989) concept around
“place” and “space” helps to clarify how the sense of place gives meaning to the often
marginalized lives of migrants living in the urban areas through political organization and
cultural activities. In this sense, migrant communities help create “reproduced
communities” within these urban spaces. As an example of how the changing of place
and space in a short time affected Peru’s makeup Higgins (1988) as cited by Heredia
(2016) stated that,
As peasants abandoned the land and flocked to the cities, Peru was transformed in
the space of a few decades from a rural country into a predominantly urban
society. The main focus of migration was, of course, the capital and by the 1980s,
two-thirds of Lima’s population were migrants or children of migrants (Higgins,
as cited in Heredia. 2016, p. 209).
Presently, the migrant communities are usually located in the periphery of the city
and are tightly knit and organized into Associations of Migrants (AoM) that connect each
village and their migrant members that live in Lima and other larger cities around the
country. Members typically share a strong interest in their hometown and have plans of
returning someday to improve it and live there or simply to visit. The political
organization aspect of the locale normally attempts to stimulate development in their
home villages. Return visits of migrants have an important impact on their villages as
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migrants diffuse knowledge concerning Lima and the outside world and promote further
contact between the city and village. With increasing migration, more formal steps may
be taken to institutionalize aid to recently arrived migrants, previously available through
kin and friendship ties, and the AoM may become a formal buffer between rural and
urban life.
Adapting to the language, culture, and climate of the capital when coming from
the Andes can be very challenging, especially when one is already an extremely
marginalized individual in society. Many members of the communities in this research
arrived in the city in this same manner and without the ability to work in professional
jobs; In addition, because they lacked resources, they usually had to invade lands to have
a place to sleep.
The locales play an important role as a cultural space in the urban areas in the city
providing a much-needed recreational outlet in addition to its function as a political
organization. Indeed, it could be that the marginalization so many of these migrant
communities feel in their places of work only adds more to their desire to participate in
the commission and have their political voice heard. (Sevillano, 2016). The commission
consists of people who have been elected to manage some political and social
responsibilities in the locales; these positions of authority change on a regular basis.
In this sense, these locales are entrenched aspects of politics and culture not only
within the locales, but also extending to the villages. Many of these areas, especially in
the area of Lima called Villa El Salvador (VES) where this study partly takes place, are
areas of land invasiones (invasions) that have been continual areas of political
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contestation. This political contestation has in turn created many forms of citizen
organization. After many invasions and removals of people and their houses over years,
VES was finally established as a “self-managing” community on the outskirts of Lima
during the 1970’s under the Velasco government. These and other similar areas were
populated by families from the rural provinces during these decades, leaving an important
impact on the development of the city. Regarding these locales, Peattie (1990) states that,
‘local politics’ and ‘citizen participation’ at the community level are linked to national
politics, not simply as a reflection of, but also as an agency in that politics” (Peattie,
1990, p. 29).

Customary political organization
Political Organization and Social Structure
Issues of marginalization, primitive accumulation, and environmental conflict
make JEM a good candidate for a study on the effects of customary political organization
(CPO) on the development of the mining industry. In both villages of this study, political
organization is based in La Directiva-Comunal (The Communal Directive), which
includes the President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer and Speaker (PACCPERU
2011). The Communal Directive is an autonomous governing body elected by the village
asambleas to organize the community, manage the land, and interact with the larger
Peruvian government. This type of organization has governed everything from law and
order, to land, water, and other natural resources rights. The social structure of Quechua
communities in Peru has a large impact on their forms of political organization.
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These communities include the family, the village or pueblo and their Communal
Directive or gobierno comunal, the locale or the community of village migrants that live
in the capital. In addition, there is the communal network or red comunal, which is an
organization of various Communal Directives over a certain region which interact with
the larger Peruvian government. Increasingly in modern times, as economies, technology,
and politics are changing these asambleas are confronting issues of greater and greater
political impact and significance.
The family plays an important role in politics in Quechua communities because it
is the main social unit represented in the village. Each family acts as a different voice in
the village meetings, called asambleas, to give different perspectives about the issue of
the day, and each family has its own hierarchical organization. For example, the elders
are more important than the young people especially with regards to their political
perspectives. As an individual ages, their perspective becomes more important in the
decisions that the village makes together. Usually most families hold family meetings, or
reuniones, whenever necessary in order to discuss issues that are affecting the family or
the community. These issues could include education, health, business opportunities,
familial problems, local political leadership, community corruption, and most important,
the discussions about layme (land management and distribution). In this sense, the
families are the social fabric that weaves the villages and their political interests together.
This social fabric aspect of the family becomes truly evident when a local
politician fails in one of their duties or is caught in some type of corruption. For example,
in some communities, some families are known for being corrupt and this has an effect
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for generations. Even newer generations who were not involved in any corruption will be
reminded of the corruption of their ancestors throughout their lives, and especially
forcefully when they begin to assume any important political charges. “Remember that
your Grandfather lost this piece of land to another village because he loved a woman
from there, do not follow his footsteps”, is something many young people commonly
grow up hearing. In this way the actions of past and current family members reflect upon
the whole family, which functions as a device of social control to make every member
conscious of their actions.
The village consists of a small number of families that live together in one area
and control the land and water in that territory through varied indigenous forms of
political organization. The families that live in that area govern the use of land and water
through asambleas. The asamblea is a democratic meeting where all the families
participate to govern land and water use, construct roads, manage education, resolve
territorial problems with other pueblos and many other aspects of village life. The
asamblea also determines who will run the Communal Directive.
Communal-based Land Management
Land management can imply different types of management and development of
resources depending on who is in a position of authority regarding these decisions. In
communal land management people often work together, share land areas, especially
those used for grazing and foot and water passage, and benefit from the land together.
Additionally, community-based land management is based on a consensus decision-
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making process involving all the members of the community, and this process allows for
a fairly equal distribution land resources. Every member of the community helps and
benefits from this arrangement and it is a very good form of customary land management.
This lies in stark contrast to the capitalist and neoliberal idea of market competition and
resource exploitation.
In order to accomplish this type of mostly equal distribution of resources and
labor, the Quechua economic system encompasses many concepts. These include
“mutual assistance” (in Quechua, ayni) “shared land and labor” (minka) and “land use
and distribution”, (layme). These are common words/practices in Quechua that have been
maintained for more than 500 years, and they continue to be integral parts of these
communities. Customary management in the Andes over time can be considered as a
form of cultural and historical management of local resources, the most important being
the control, distribution, and administration of the land and its produce. Additionally,
communal management of the land for the Quechua communities in the Andes is a
significant and important form of indigenous economic power. Attempts to measure
“indigenous territory” have been made to see how much land indigenous people need to
govern in this fashion (Davis & Wali, 1994). These forms of communal land
management have given rise to new concepts around land titling and land tenure within
the fields of Deep Ecology and Indigenous Land Management (Robbins, 2012).
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Land tenure
These different forms of common pool resource management would be
impossible without land tenure, or the ability to own, hold, and pass down property over
generations. Equally, without the official titling of lands over the past decades, as detailed
above, it would also be impossible to have any functioning system of land tenure in the
modern legal sense. As Schwartzman and Zimmerman (2005) stated, “Although
necessary, tenure security for indigenous peoples is not tantamount to sustainable
management. Typically, indigenous people need to continue and develop their own sociocultural role according their context in order to manage their own resources” (Brandon
1996 in Schwartzman & Zimmerman 2005, p. 724). For example, the distribution of land
in Quechua communities, specifically in this research can be considered equitable
because the socio-political structure of the communities this distribution has always
maintained certain historical regulations such as, hereditary land tenure, communal dry
land farming, and demarcated lands for community pasture use. Hereditary land tenure is
a system of generational land ownership that is usually located close to the town that
includes houses with their respective yards or small fields. If there are people who do not
have land or migrate to these communities, they need the permission of the community if
they want to build a house in the free areas that belong to all of the community.
Furthermore, all the members of the community know which family owns each plot of
land that is close to the village.
In contrast, communal dry land farming is practiced on land far away from the
village and is the place where villagers plant potatoes, olluco, oca, etc. It is usually at an
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elevation of 4000 meters above sea level. Usually every two years they rotate this
communal dryland, which is known as layme, which means “a new place where you can
plant” and “farmland of potato by rotation” (Paredes, 2008, p. 39).
This rotation depends on the decision of the asamblea, or the meeting of the
population in a form of direct democracy, where by mutual agreement the population
decides where the next layme will be. First, the members of the community decide which
members will be in charge of the distribution of the land for each family. This process is
rigorous especially if it is about new land that the community never used before or in the
case of land obtained by conflict between other communities; in these cases, it is
important to equally distribute the land use among the community members. They
usually separate fields of land of about 30 acres, and they plot an equal sized field for
each family. Next, each family draws numbers and these numbers correspond to different
plots in the layme. For the next two years, each family helps to plant and harvest this
land, while a special group of people known as kamayoq protect this land during the
growing season from free-grazing animals. This is a form of ever-changing land tenure
that allows for successful and equitable ownership and management of large areas of land
(Yates, 2015).
Finally, demarcated lands for community pasture are free for all animals to graze.
For example, the cows, horses, alpacas, etc. of the communities of this study can graze
freely on any area of this land. Usually the cows can walk in the mountains and every
four months you can walk to see where your cows are located.
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Thus, the community organizes a rotation schedule for all of the different
families’ plots so that not only does everyone have a place to grow food, but they also
avoid soil erosion in this manner. These examples provide concrete evidence of how
these communal-based land practices benefit members of the community in labor
expenditure, equal opportunity, food production, environmental protection, and more.

Mining in Peru
According to previous research about the historical accounts of JEM places in
colonial times, the Spanish exploited many indigenous people in order to extract any
minerals that they could, mostly gold and silver (Cordova, 2015). After independence
from Spain, the people in those places continued living and developing their own
economic activity largely based on subsistence farming until recent decades.
Distribution of mining rents
The economy of Latin America continues to be based on the extraction of natural
resources, especially minerals, by focusing on the attraction of international investment
such as the mining industry. Furthermore, countries such as Peru have become highly
dependent on this type of economy, without generating their own national industry to use
these raw resources and sell them for a higher price as manufactured products; instead,
Peru is trapped in a type of modern-day mercantilism. Indeed, the mining industry in Peru
could drive economic expansion in the nation if it were to use its resources to
manufacture rather than just export, but until now this industry has been largely used for
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extraction by foreign companies such as Peru Copper Inc. (Canada, China) Xstrata plc
(UK, Switzerland), Freeport-McMoRan Inc. (USA), and Monterrico Metals (China). This
situation has a unique relationship with social conflict that is rooted in local
environmental concern (Loayza & Rigolini, 2016).
Mining activity economically benefits the nation through the use of a process
called canon minero, which essentially taxes the extraction of resources and then
redistributes that income through government assistance programs based on population.
The economic benefits are allocated to regions, provinces, and districts based on their
population rather than wherever the mining activity is actually in operation (Table 2).
This creates conflicts over the distribution of royalties across the region (Zavalla, 2004;
Jaskoski, 2014). Corruption and political interests often lead to mismanaging of the funds
that are received as a part of these royalties. This intensifies social conflicts between
regional politicians who at the same time need resources for their political campaigns.
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This is how the corruption of money, mining, and politics is influencing social
movements that are happening in the Andes of Peru.
Table 2: Canon Minero by State 1996-Silva, López, Kuramoto p.182)
States
Lima
Cañete
Huaura
Huaral
Barranca
Huarochiri
Oyon
Yauyos
Cajatambo
Canta
TOTAL

Canon minero
96-01
12,397,791
594,326
563,554
402,252
382,741
311,509
219,990
218,722
51,844
42,752
15,185,481

% Canon
minero
81.64
3.91
3.71
2.65
2.52
2.05
1.45
1.44
0.34
0.28
100.00

Population
2001
6,863,363
172,476
182,826
148,358
122,201
60,945
17,903
27,904
9,501
11,716
7,617,193

% of
Population
90.10
2.26
2.40
1.95
1.60
0.80
0.24
0.37
0.12
0.15
100.00

Calcauso
Since President Alberto Fujimori opened Peru to an expansion of neoliberal
international investment many corporations are seeking to enter these regions and gain
access to extract minerals. By 2008 they had started to explore in the region of this
study. By 2010 some companies were using some new strategies of arriving in individual
communities to initiate dialogue. This type of formal dialogue is well known today, and
is called a consulta previa, or a previous consultation. This is a vital step in the
negotiation process that companies are be required to perform with indigenous
communities before the extraction of natural resources from their land.
Since 2010 two different mining corporations have been trying to enter the
community of Calcauso. First, the Peruvian company Consorcio Minero Horizonte S.A.
(CMH), arrived and offered an economic benefit to the community of $10,000 for each
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100 hectares that were used as well as the creation of a social fund to the amount of $
24,723.20 to finance some programs and projects that the community needed. In 2014,
another mining company arrived in this community after Horizonte failed its
negotiations. However, negotiation between these two companies during this time has
finally resulted in a big project called the Corina Project. This project is located in the
community of Calcauso and focuses on “... an epithermal gold deposit of mainly minerals
such as gold and silver” (Minera Ares S.A.C, 2017, p.1). This project is now owned by a
consortium of mining companies including the Peruvian company Minera Ares S.A.C., a
subsidiary of British-owned Hochschild Mining P.L.C.
Mollebamba
In colonial times, Mollebamba attracted foreigners searching for minerals such
gold and silver (Cordova, 2015). According to local oral history there were many places
in the district of JEM that were exploited. Today, in Mollebamba there is the project of
Trapiche. The company in this place is Buenaventura S.A.C., a Peruvian company
dedicated to exploration, development, construction, and mining operations. Specifically,
in this project they are mining for copper and molybdenum, as well as other minerals in
smaller quantities. This project was explored in different stages from 1994 to 1998 and
finally in 2000 they started the cartographic and geological work necessary for
environmental impact studies on about 450 hectares. In 2006, based on the results of
these studies, the company obtained permission to go ahead with mining activity in 2009.
By 2010, mining activity was ongoing and this study has attempted to evaluate this
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experience in Mollebamba and contrast it with that of Calcauso; these results are
explained in detail in Chapter 4. Thus, mining operations in this region of the Andes have
a long history, predating that of the Spanish arrival, continuing through colonial times,
and expanding recently in the epoch of neoliberal international investment.
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Chapter 3: Methods

My thesis research focused on Quechua indigenous communities of the Peruvian
Andes and their forms of political organization extending from the villages (pueblos) to
migrant communities in the capital (locales). The purpose of this research was to
understand the complex political structure of these different entities and understand how
they have negotiated with mining operations taking place in these communities.
Specifically, two communities: Calcauso and Mollebamba were used as a comparative
case study. Below, I explain the epistemology and methodology on which research is
based in more detail.

Epistemology: A Pragmatic Approach to Indigenous Studies
Approaching my research with a “pragmatic” epistemology helped me to use my
mixed-methods data collection processes to truly listen to, and attempt to understand, the
various opinions in the communities that I studied. As the communities that this research
focused on have been marginalized by society for centuries, it was critical that I respected
and understood this history so as not to repeat further marginalization with my study.
Most principally, I chose to study Quechua indigenous communities because I am from
those communities and I consider it as my responsibility to help and advocate for them,
especially because their voice is often the faintest in the national debate about mining.
Additionally, my experience with the language, culture, and local politics of these
communities was invaluable as it helped my qualitative understanding and analysis of the
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perspectives of the people in these two villages and permitted me trusted access to the
most intimate areas of these communities’ politics, sociocultural dynamics, and the direct
impacts on their family lives. With the mining company affecting my village in such
diverse ways, I found it necessary to unravel the diverse perspectives about these
phenomena through a participatory/advocacy approach.
Consequently, I needed to constantly be aware of the “action agenda for reform”
that I was pursuing in relation to my research. As John Creswell explained about
advocacy research, “...inquiry needs to be intertwined with politics and a political
agenda...research should contain an action agenda for reform that may change the lives of
the participants, the institutions in which individuals work or live, and the researcher's
life” (Creswell, 2003, pp. 9-10). In this sense, protecting the communities in my study
from unnecessary exploitation by mining corporations, beneficial education for the
communities, and open conversation about their opinions on these vital issues were my
primary “action” objectives with this study. Recommendations informed by this research
to address their situation are presented in the Discussion Chapter of this thesis.
Approaching my studies from a “pragmatist’s” stance was appropriate. A
pragmatic approach gives the researcher the ability to utilize a wide array of strategies to
best suit their particular inquiry. It allows the researcher to focus on the “problem” at
hand more than the “method” in use; As Creswell explained, “Instead of methods being
important, the problem is most important, and researchers use all approaches to
understand the problem” (Creswell, 2003, p. 11). To capture as much information as
possible, my research employed qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis,
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and the pragmatic approach seemed best suited for this mixed-methods methodology. The
use of both qualitative and quantitative data helps, “...to provide the best understanding of
a research problem” (Creswell, 2003, p.12). Finally, as stated at the beginning of this
section, my research includes an advocacy aspect, because of my relationship with these
communities, making it highly political. As Creswell noted further, pragmatism helps
apply, “...a theoretical lens that is reflexive of social justice and political aims” (Creswell
2003, p. 12). In sum, the specificity and complexity of my research question and research
location coupled with its socio-political and environmental urgency were such that a
pragmatic grounded-theory approach seemed the most sensible for this particular study.
Through this research I sought to help indigenous communities, particularly those
suffering exploitation from mining corporations, to be included in the decision-making
process of the state and market actors. Indigenous communities’ missing voice is key to
creating a more socially-just and environmentally-equitable and sustainable form of
development. I hope this research will identify existing strategies and provide new
strategies of successful political organization that can help these indigenous communities
have an equal place at the negotiating table.

Methodology: A Comparative and Grounded Case Study Format
This part of my paper explains my specific case-study research methodology and
some tactics applied in my investigation. According to Helen Newing , “The
methodology is concerned with what you will actually do… [And] must also include an
overall strategy that fits the different methods together into a coherent design” (Newing,
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2010, p. 43). There were three important aspects to my methodology: (1) my comparative
case study format, (2) my use of grounded theory to guide my research, and (3) my
employment of mixed methods to perform my data collection and analysis.
This study compared research results from two communities about their members’
feelings towards the mining industry, their political organization, and their effect on
regional environmental politics. Comparing and analyzing data about social and
environmental changes from these remote villages gave my research better diagnostic
capability to determine differences and similarities between these communities. As
Newing explained, “Comparative case study design is concerned with describing
similarities and differences in different examples and discussing possible interpretations”
(Newing, 2010, p. 48).
In addition, I also included in this case study each of these villages’ satellite
migrant communities that live in the capital, known colloquially as locales. The locales
are important communities to analyze as well because of the way they can affect their
villages of origin politically and economically. I know from being a member of these
communities and speaking with people there, how strong the influence of these locales
can be on the villages’ political, social, economic, and environmental decisions.
However, as these areas have not been studied in-depth by researchers, this knowledge is
difficult to find properly documented anywhere. I found this lack of information to be
another compelling reason for carrying out a case study of these communities. As
Newing noted, “If the project is addressing a new, poorly developed area of research,
almost any case study should add something to the current state of knowledge” (Newing,
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2010, p. 47). Finally, I realized that while both of these villages and their satellite
communities are very similar e.g. in race, religion, language, and culture, they are in
different stages concerning the development of the mining industry and their political
organization may be different. This is why I believed a case study, specifically a
comparative case study, was an excellent method for my research as it enabled me to
gather a large amount of information about an area that has largely not been studied.
Throughout this research I used grounded theory as a guide for my comparative
case study. A grounded theory approach allows the researcher to gather information
before creating a hypothesis or thesis, thus permitting a continual development of the
main ideas and theories that will inform the results of the research. Grounded theory was
appropriate for this research, because previous data on these areas was lacking and
because I wanted to have a participatory aspect to my data collection and wait to develop
my thesis completely until after I had gathered all of the data. In other words, I
developed my thesis throughout my study as I collected information and listened to
community members’ thoughts and then, used the resources, knowledge, and ideas of the
community members to guide my further data collection, analysis, and theorizing.
(Creswell, 2007), explained that, “Grounded theory is a qualitative research design in
which the inquirer generates a general explanation (a theory) of a process, action, or
interaction shaped by the views of a large number of participants” (Creswell, 2007, p.
63). Therefore, I was attempting to not only include these communities in a participatory
research design, but also to modify my narrative of these case studies as the research
progressed according to the input I received from these communities.
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As this case-study followed a grounded theory and mixed methods approach it
was necessary to develop an organized approach to my data collection and analysis. To
this end, this research used “concurrent procedure”. (Creswell, 2003) explains about this
procedure that, “The researcher converges quantitative and qualitative data in order to
provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem” (Creswell, 2003, p. 16).
Therefore, I collected qualitative and quantitative data at the same time from all possible
sources in order to finally integrate and analyze them. This use of concurrent procedure
correlated very effectively with my use of an advocacy/participatory and pragmatic
approach, a grounded theory framework, and a mixed methods data collection and
analysis process.
A mixed methods approach was indispensable because it allowed me to be more
flexible about what type of data I could gather, both qualitative and quantitative. As this
research followed a grounded theory procedure for data collection, I received direction
from these two communities about my mixed methods data collection and analysis,
which enabled me to follow their ideas and advice in a much more flexible and formative
way. Moreover, gathering both qualitative and quantitative data encouraged me to gather
as much information as possible about these communities, this was important because of
the lack of previous research done on these areas of Peru. Finally, using quantitative and
qualitative approaches to analyze the data gave me many complementary ways to view,
revise and present my analysis. (Newing, 2010) claimed that the term mixed-methods
refers “...specifically to research that combines quantitative and qualitative social science
approaches…they can therefore complement one another in mixed-methods study”
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(Newing, 2010, p. 58). In this sense, a mixed methods approach provided an appropriate
way to study and compare my different case studies, follow my grounded theory, and
correspondingly gather, analyze, and present my data.

Methods
I applied qualitative and quantitative data collection procedures including
informal conversations, observational research, semi-structured interviews, household
surveys and review of archival documents. My data analysis combined the use of
extensive thematic coding of interviews and statistical analysis of household survey data
to corroborate findings in both categories of data. I conducted a total of 70 interviews and
186 surveys in the villages and locales that addressed issues pertaining to demographics,
mining, political organization, and respondents’ opinions on the various changes taking
place in their communities.
Participant Selection Process
Quantitative
I recruited potential participants for the household surveys using a random sample
of village households in two villages. To obtain a random sample of houses in each
village I used Google Maps satellite imagery of each village that I edited with Krita
(Krita 3.0 2016) so that each household was selected in red and numbered in black
(Figures 7 and 8). After each household was numbered in each village, I used the
National Statistical Service’s (2017) Sample Size Calculator to determine the total
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number of people to be surveyed in the villages.6 Once this number was determined, I
used a random number generator to create a list of numbers of houses marked for a
survey (Appendix D).
Once a household was selected, I visited the household and asked if they would
like to participate in the survey (customary practice for approaching people in Quechua
villages). Even with the random list of households to survey, a map, and my personal
knowledge of the terrain, there were times when I would find no one at home in the
houses pre-selected for survey. This caused a dilemma. To maintain as much randomness
as possible, a coin was flipped at each house where this occurred and depending on the
result, the survey was administered at either the house to its left or right.

6

In each village I attempted to do at least 45 surveys as the total population of both communities was
approximately 1,600 people and therefore the sample size needed to be at least 91 individuals in total to
give me a confidence level of at least 95% with a confidence interval of at least +/- 0.1. My goal was to
conduct more surveys than this if possible, but this was a minimum. In the end, I was able to conduct 142
surveys in the villages: Calcauso (85) and Mollebamba (57) giving this research an increased confidence
level to 99% with the same confidence interval of +/- 0.1 (National Statistics Service Sample Size
Calculator, 2017; Appendix D).
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Figure 6 - Map of Calcauso with houses numbered for random sampling.
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Figure 7 – Map of Mollebamba with houses numbered for random sampling.

67
Qualitative
I recruited potential candidates for interviews using the same randomization
process described for the surveys above. I sought to carry out at least fifteen interviews in
each community. I hoped to accomplish more interviews if possible, but I wanted to be
sure to have a random sample of some households to begin with (Appendix C). As part of
my grounded theory approach, I realized once in the village that it would also be
beneficial to speak with close family members from these communities, as well as with
individuals who held positions of authority. From there, I was able to use the participants’
knowledge to generate interviews with more individuals that they knew or recommended.
Utilizing this strategy, I was able to not only complete my randomly-generated
interviews, but also many others of importance, bringing my total interviews to 58 in the
two villages and another 12 in the migrant communities for a total of 70. I could not
accomplish more interviews in the migrant communities because the geographical
distance between their homes in Lima was often too great for me to visit them in my
limited research time frame.
Language Notes
According to Ronald Czaja and John Blair, “The reliability of data obtained
through survey research rests, in large part, on the uniform administration of questions
and their uniform interpretation by respondents” (Czaja & Blair, 2005, p. 63). This was
one major challenge for me as I needed to administer these questionnaires in both
Spanish and Quechua, which meant that an excellent translation was necessary. To
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accomplish this, I used my own personal knowledge of Quechua as my native language
and I also consulted with Quechua language experts in Peru.
Household Survey
The household surveys were created using Google Forms and were then translated
into Spanish, and Quechua. These were then printed out into hard copies so they could be
brought to these communities. To begin each survey, I arrived at the selected homes and
greeted the people inside, then I would ask for the mother and father of the home. I
explained to them the purpose of the survey and the consent form and requested their
participation. Only two households declined to do a survey because they were very busy
or were not interested. About half of my surveys were conducted in Quechua and the
other half in Spanish. I recorded all of my surveys with a Miray 8GB GMD-20 audio
recorder to be sure I did not mistake any of their answers. I administered most surveys
personally rather than having participants fill them out themselves by reading each
question, answering questions if there was confusion, and marking the answer for the
participant. Notably, most of the young people (18-39) were able to complete the surveys
themselves without assistance while most of the women usually chose to answer the
survey I had translated into Quechua. As most men speak Spanish regardless of age, they
chose to have the survey administered in Spanish.
Once all of the surveys were complete on paper, the data were entered into
Google Forms for further analysis. In total, there were 85 survey responses in Calcauso,
57 in Mollebamba and 44 survey responses from the locales To filter the information
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gathered through this small-scale survey I have only chosen to highlight here information
from the SPSS linear regression results that show an F value of at least 1.0 and an R
squared value of single digit percentages, this should provide more confidence that my
results did not arise due to a sampling error. I focused my analysis on how people said
they felt about mining, village politics, migrant participation in village politics, and how
these ideas correlated with demographics such as age, gender, village of origin,
indigenous identity, and employment status.
Household surveys were a very important aspect of my study as they allowed me
to gather a large amount of data on political, environmental, and social perspectives and
then code the data using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to make
inferences about the data. This allowed me to then cross-reference these results with the
archival documents I copied and took photos of while in the communities, giving a good
picture of the political organization and its effects on environmental politics in the region.
Finally, qualitative data from interviews were coded and employed to cross-reference
responses. This provided triangulation of the accumulated data.
Semi-structured interviews
The majority of interviews, 58, were completed in the villages with 12 interviews
coming from the locales. All of the interviews were video recorded using a GoPro Hero
or a Canon EO5 Rebel T3 camera and audio recorded using a Miray 8GB GMD-20 audio
recorder. No one declined the audio recording, but the video recording made some
participants nervous, so I only recorded videos when participants were very willing.
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Actually, many of them were happy with the video because they said that future
generations perhaps will remember them if one day they are able to see the video. Before
beginning my pre-selected random interviews, I began with interviewing people who
were close to me geographically and relationally. As a new researcher, this not only
helped me to develop my interview skills more and test my recording technology, it also
helped to me gain a general understanding of the current political, economic, and
sociocultural context in these communities.
Usually the interviews were conducted at the participant’s home, but some were
also carried out in their fields while they were working, and even sometimes while we
were walking in the mountains. In some cases, I adjusted the questions, because the
respondents did not understand many academic words, especially when they only spoke
Quechua. One big difference between semi-structured and structured interviews is that
with semi-structured interviews the researcher has more liberty to change the question
order, skip or add a question, as well as ensuring a maximum ability to each interviewee
to speak freely for as long as they wish.
Newing (2010) suggested the use of an “interview guide” to help with the
organizational structure of the interviews. Utilizing this interview guide while gauging
individual context, knowledge, and emotion of my research participants, led me to ask
some questions of some people that I did not ask of others, I may have even skipped or
added some questions based on the responses of my interviewees. I wanted my
interviewees to be able to talk freely about the specific or general questions. I hoped this
would make them comfortable enough to also ask me some questions so we could freely
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converse about them. Newing tells us that, “An underlying premise of qualitative
interviewing is that the less you direct the conversation and the more you gain the trust of
the interviewee, the more accurate the information that emerges” (Newing2010: 98). I
believe that my ability to speak with these communities in many different settings, in
their native language of Quechua, and my knowledge of the culture and politics of these
communities helped me greatly as an inside researcher in gaining the “trust” of my
interviewees. As Newing (2010), explains, “semi structured interviews are more targeted
than unstructured interviews but more flexible than questionnaires” (Newing, 2010, p.
102). These semi-structured interviews were an invaluable aspect to my research,
especially once I collected the household surveys and compared the answers.
Informal Interviews
In addition to semi-structured interviews, I also conducted various informal
interviews, which included informal conversations with members of the community.
More of my free time was spent in the village of Calcauso, because sometimes my father
needed my help in his fields; these provided good moments for informal interviews.
Newing states that informal interviews can be very helpful in, “...providing information
related to the background and context of the study cross-checking information gathered
by more structured methods” (Newing, 2010, p. 100). These informal interviews were
very important because people were always busy in these villages and usually they did
not have time to spend an entire hour with me. Therefore, I took advantage of
opportunities to speak with different members of the communities in different contexts.
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This included speaking with men and women when they were walking to their fields or
caring for their animals. It also included speaking with women privately when they were
cooking, or speaking with men privately during their break time from work. Finally, a
great informal moment to speak with people privately and in small groups was during
mealtime, these were situations where people feel more comfortable and they were more
prone to say what they really think or believe without my input or questions. This made
informal interviews an important aspect of my study.
Participant Observation
In addition to my interviews, I also observed as many meetings (asambleas) as
possible in the communities of this research. Being an inside researcher, I was also
permitted to film these assemblies using the recording equipment mentioned above, this
is not something they have allowed others to do. During these assemblies, I also took
extensive notes focused on understanding the perspectives, practices, and daily routines
of the members of these communities while engaged in the political process.
General Assemblies happen twice a week in each village, but if there is some kind
of emergency, an Emergency Assembly can be called to resolve the issue. In addition to
these General Assemblies, each week they have at least two meetings called sesiones.
This type of meeting includes the elected authorities from the different quadrants of the
village who join to discuss local matters to decide if they can be resolved there or if they
need to be reported up to the General Assembly.
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Meetings are usually announced using a megaphone at 5:00 A.M. and people
appear by 6:00 A.M., the meeting usually lasts until 7:00 A.M. After the meeting,
everyone leaves the village for their own work. Through my observation I wanted to
illuminate how people express themselves in the asambleas, how they interact as a
community, and most importantly how they organize themselves for everything from
land distribution, housing construction, and field maintenance to political action that
directly affects regional environmental politics. Finally, as this is a comparative case
study, I hoped to compare the different methods of political organization between the two
villages that I researched. Not only is observational research a great method for
comparative case studies, but according to Newing (2010), observational research also,
“...aims at in-depth description and understanding rather than explanation” and when
combined with comparative case studies it can, “...draw inferences and generate theories
about the differences between them” (Newing, 2010, p.46). This benefited my grounded
theory development process.
Document Review
The final aspect of my qualitative data gathering was a review of various official
documents from these communities including community statutes, mining agreements,
letters from mining companies, correspondence between migrant communities and
villagers, and the archival records of the actions of previous village assemblies. In
addition to this form of documentation, the meetings in these villages that are discussed
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above also have officially recorded minutes, which I have documented and have
attempted to include in my analysis
Extensive Strategies of Data Collection and Analysis
My research contains different type of strategies that permitted my investigation
to gain a broad understanding of the communities studied here. In this sense, my
epistemological choice to apply an advocacy/participatory approach and pragmatism
were beneficial as they provided a framework of direction that was largely decided by the
very communities that I am advocating for. Furthermore, by using grounded theory to
improve and add ideas, input, and information from the community members, I was
trying to ensure that these traditionally marginalized communities did not become more
so during the course of this study.
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Chapter 4: Results

These data results show the most prominent themes that emerged after
thematically coding all interviews and using descriptive and correlative statistics on the
survey data with SPSS and Google Sheets Statistics.
The most important themes to emerge during this research process centered on the
economic and social challenges the villages and locales face as a result of increased
globalization and specifically the arrival of international mining corporations in the area.
In discussing these themes, I distinguished two principal categories: customary political
organization (CPO) and negotiations with the mining companies. In order to understand
the political structure of these communities, it is important to understand the political
connections with other organizations such as migrant communities for village decisionmaking processes, and how they shape power relations in village politics (Table 1).

Customary Political Organization (CPO)
The political organization that exists in both the villages and locales is unique.
Major themes emerging from the interviews in this regard include the assembly structure,
the process for voting between villages and locales, and the general authority and tasks
that this political organization is charged with executing within these communities. The
surveys also revealed some interesting details about political organization in these areas.
To determine which factors were most important in regard to political organization to
which community members, several multi-variance tests were executed. These tested the
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independent variables: gender, age, village of origin, and if the participant had lived in
the capital or not against the five dependent variables: (1) Frequency of participation in
village assemblies; (2) Ever having had a position of authority in the village; (3) Belief
that village authorities work for best interest of the community; (4) Belief that political
organization positively affects negotiations with the mines; and (5) Belief that villagers
who now live in the locales should participate in village politics.
Political organization of the villages
The political organization in the villages of Calcauso and Mollebamba has some
similarities to the formal organization of the central government, most principally in the
names and roles of the different positions of authority. According to one village leader
from Calcauso:
The organization of the Board of Directors in the community is similar to the
institutions of the state that has its President, Vice President, Secretary,
Treasurer, Prosecutor, etc. Both of the communities have their own written
statutes that help to organize their political structure and these statutes can be
modified by the assembly when circumstances change that might demand
modifications.

Thus, these communities are organized according to written rules, however; these rules
can be changed as needed. As another leader of the village of Calcauso explained, “For
example the statute of Calcauso says the term for the President is two years. but in 2008
the assembly the community decided on just a one year term; because of the mining
question it is dangerous to allow a President to remain for two years”. This flexibility
years.” This flexibility allowed these communities to change certain rules of authority by
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consensus of the community when circumstances changed at the beginning of the
negotiation with the mining companies. The frequency of assemblies and who the
authorities are in these assemblies is thus of crucial importance for these communities.
Frequency and demographics of village assemblies
In the villages it was reported by interview participants that they hold weekly or
biweekly sessions where the elected representatives and those in positions of authority
meet, bring concerns from their wards of the village, and report back the results of the
sessions. Assemblies for both villages, where all members come and participate, were
held every month. These assemblies usually lasted for a few hours on average in
Calcauso and an entire day in Mollebamba. The surveys indicated that middle-aged
migrants (30-65) were the primary attendees making up 71.2% of the total monthly
assemblies while only accounting for approximately 46.7% of the total voting population
(PACC Peru, 2010), this age group was therefore overrepresented by 52% as warranted
by population. In addition, less participation in the monthly meetings was witnessed for
participants between the ages of 18-29 and past the age of 65 at only 28.8%. As this
population accounted for approximately 53% of the total voting population, it can be said
that these age groups were underrepresented by 54% as compared with their population
index. The second dependent variable test about having had a position of authority in the
village or not showed that if the participant was male, they were more likely to have had
a position of authority in the village than if they were female (Figures 17 and 18).
Furthermore, these results also signified that the older an individual was the more likely
they were to have held a position of authority in the village. The most significant factors
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contributing to whether an individual “ever had a position of authority in the village”
were gender and age with Pearson Correlation values of 0.325 and -0.205 respectively.
In this case, I divided the age groups into those between the age of 18-39 (Figure 19), and
those over the age of 40 (Figure 20), to see the differences between them.

Table 3: Position of authority in the village by Gender and Age
Demographics

Position of Authority - Yes

Position of Authority - No

Males
Females
Ages 18-39
Ages 40+

82.2%
50.7%
55.3%
72.6%

17.8%
49.3%
44.7%
27.4%

These results are some of the most reliable so far tested according to the F and
Sig. values reported, they showed a very low likelihood of having been obtained through
a sampling error. They also seem to be the most significant so far accounting for about
16.3% of total variance, this means that gender and age account for this percentage of
possible reasons why someone would have had a position of authority or not. The
positive and negative correlation values for gender and age will be examined in the
Discussion chapter of this thesis.
Assembly decision-making process
It is important to understand how the community assembly decides what kind of
instruments of authority can be used in order to make decisions. As one individual from
Calcauso explained “...the assembly is the maximum authority, there it is decided if we
will follow what the paper says or what is proper for the population.” The assembly is
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the central power of the decision-making process and its implementation allows the
participation of the community in a form of direct democracy by permitting each
community member to not only participate in the meetings but vote directly as well. This
allows them to maintain the interest of the community at heart when solving direct
problems. The assembly functions very much in the same capacity in both Mollebamba
and Calcauso. As a member from the village of Mollebamba said, “The assembly
resolves and analyses the problems, the leaders utilize the assembly as an instrument and
like a situation of support”. The assembly helps community members know their opinion
and voice is heard. The assembly is highly important to solve any problem of the
community and that encourages greater cohesion in the community. As a member from
the village of Calcauso said:
The assembly puts order and discipline. If it were not for the assembly and the
duties of the community there would be disorder here...this is why we work well,
the assembly is like a father or mother...there in the assembly we discuss
everything and we air our dirty laundry, if it were not for the assembly there
would be tremendous disorganization.
Despite the importance of the process of decision-making and organization in the
community, it is important to acknowledge some changes that they are facing in modern
times. Due to the emergence of some critical issues surrounding the mine, authorities
often need to hold more than two assemblies in the same month. While assemblies still go
for an entire day in Mollebamba, the assemblies in Calcauso have had to reduce their
available time for discussion, especially if the agenda is about mining, otherwise it could
take too much time to reach 100% complete consensus, instead majority consensus is
considered acceptable. This has led to some people losing their speaking privileges and
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having disagreements among themselves as a result of the pressure from these outside
economic and social forces. One interviewee from Calcauso said,
“The assemblies don’t want to delay more hours...after two or three opinions they
want to cut off the discussion...Before, the assemblies didn’t stop the whole damn
day! Now [they go] for just a few hours, 2 or 3 [people] put in their opinions and
we’re done, the decision [for mining] is already approved!...In one assembly they
didn’t let me speak because I kicked out the miners [who are not from the village]
from the assembly...What the hell are they doing here anyway and what do they
have to do in our assembly [the engineers of the mining company]!? They have no
reason to be listening, they should be outside of the community, we have to have
the debate among ourselves.”
Conflicts such as this were taking place and, as noted above, even with Calcauso holding
more assemblies than Mollebamba, they still had less time to handle these conflicts
because the mining companies did not want to see a long process of complete consensusmaking in the villages because that took too much time. It is important to note here that
depending on the people in charge of the assembly and their viewpoints on mining, some
people, like the previous interviewee, may have been ostracized or cut off from speaking
their mind altogether. This was important because she said this almost never happened
before the mining company arrived in the village, so it seemed some of the rules of
consensus-making had been changing since the entrance of the mining companies.
The relative confidence in village of authorities was reflected in the correlational
relationship among the independent variables mentioned above for the survey question:
“Belief that village authorities work for the best interest of the community. The results
showed weak correlations mostly centered on gender and village of origin.7 83.9% of

7

Pearson Correlation values that were highest for gender and village of origin with values of 0.130 and
0.091 respectively.
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men and 85.7% of people from Calcauso agree or strongly agree that the authorities of
their village were working for their best interest. Women’s views were mixed, indicating
the least trust for authorities among respondents at 68.1% (Table 2). All of this seemed
to demonstrate that while the political organization in these villages is a vital and
important part of everyday life, these organizations are slowly changing due to outside
pressure, especially from the mining interests.

Table 4: Belief that authorities are working for the best interests of the community
Demographics
Male
Female
Calcauso
Mollebamba

Agree/Strongly Agree
83.9%
68.1%
85.7%
74.4%

Disagree/Strongly Disagree
8.9%
17.0%
6.3%
12.8%

Connection to the migrant locales in Lima
According to my interviews and survey data each village has one migrant
community in Lima called a locale, with whom they have had deep political, economic,
and social connections. These relationships had been under strain since mining
companies had begun to explore the region in 2004. This is discussed in further detail in
the following two themes of this chapter; however, here it is important to at least mention
that Calcauso and Mollebamba maintained different degrees of connections with their
respective locales. These connections include rules to govern political interactions
between the villages and locales including voting powers, agreements on the scope of
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political power that each organization can exert in their own sphere of influence,
economic support through loans, and traditional cultural events.
At the most basic level, the link between the villages and the locales is familial
and this often can be a route for other viewpoints to find their way into the village
assemblies. As a member from Calcauso stated, “The migrants send us [their opinions],
or if not, they come [to the village]. This is how we receive them and they explain [their
opinions] to us. They come to us, because as the migrants say, ‘I cannot forget my
Mother or my Father’.” This connection is maintained through constant communication,
economic support, and social events. Another participant from Mollebamba said,
“With the migrants, of course, we have communication. They have also asked for
support from what the mine has given us, so we have also given them [loans] to
buy their land…but before there was a [political and social] relationship.
However there came a point where we did not like the locale because they did
their activities with the name of the district and they had some misguided
Presidents that took away the will of the migrants. They also tried to fill their
pockets as soon as they made their [social] activities instead of working honestly
with others. Because of this corruption we have seen, we do not have as much
communication with migrants now.”
As another interviewee from Mollebamba also agreed that,
“The relationship is not good; the migrants seem to want to impose their
perspectives on the community and they only arrive because of the mining
ignoring important issues to members of the village like land tenure conflicts with
another community over land in the Puna.”
Even with relations between villages and locales in such a strained condition, the
vast majority of survey respondents from both Calcauso (82.1 %) and Mollebamba (75
%) agreed or strongly agreed that migrants that live in the capital should participate in
village politics. There was a moderate correlation indicating that the younger a
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respondent was, or if they were from Mollebamba, they were more likely to disagree that
migrants that live in the capital should participate in village politics.8 Table 3 shows this
response divided by those over or under 40 years old, and between the villages of
Calcauso and Mollebamba.

Table 5: Belief that migrants should participate in village politics
Demographics
Ages 18-39
Ages 40+
Calcauso
Mollebamba

Agree/Strongly Agree
69.8%
81.2%
82.1%
75.0%

Disagree/Strongly Disagree
16.3%
5.9%
11.5%
11.5%

Additional correlation analysis showed that people who have lived in the capital
had a greater tendency to believe that political organization can positively affect
negotiations with the mining companies.9 This correlation is illustrated by the fact that
almost twice the percentage of respondents (61.1%) who had lived in the city agreed or
strongly agreed that political organization affected mining negotiations compared to
respondents who had not lived in the city (39.3%). Conversely, 28.6% of respondents
who had not lived in the city disagreed that political organization affected mining
negotiations where only 12.9% of city dwellers disagreed. These differences are most
likely due to different experiences by these two groups regarding the mining negotiations,

8

This survey question showed the strongest correlations for age and village of origin with Pearson
Correlation values of -0.165 and 0.146 respectively.
9
Pearson Correlation value of 0.210 showed a weak correlation with the survey question “Belief that
political organization positively affects negotiations with the mines” and the independent variable “lived in
the capital”
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interactions with formal political institutions, and the witnessing of corruption within
their own authorities
Political organization of the locales
The Association of Migrants (AoM) acts as the political authority for migrants
from the villages Mollebamba and Calcauso who live in Lima, as mentioned above, each
village has their own migrant community in Lima. It is the equivalent of the assembly in
the villages. Their association consists of the same positions of authority and quasi-direct
democracy already described for the villages. These type of associations, created and
governed by people who migrate to the city, are commonplace and by no means unique to
the two villages described here, but rather are found for most communities of migrants
that have come from the provinces outside of Lima. As Enrique Puente, an engineer from
the Ministry of Mining and Energy, commented during a meeting at his office in Lima,
“All the communities of the region speak with their migrants [village migrants that live in
the city], it is not unique to Calcauso.” These Associations of Migrants serve the role of
organizing villagers within the city of Lima and also helping to make decisions for their
respective rural villages.
Each village creates their own AoM when they arrive in the city, even if they are
less than a dozen people. Among various AoMs from the same district, such as Juan
Espinoza Medrano, each association will elect a President to go and speak with other
Presidents from the other AoMs creating an Association of the District of Juan Espinoza
Medrano (AoD). As the Associations of Migrants function in their role as intermediaries
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between villagers and migrants from one village, the AoD functions as an intermediary
between all the district migrants in Lima collectively by interacting on a regular basis
with the Mayor of the District of Juan Espinoza Medrano. Thus, each village maintains
direct political connections with their respective AoMs, these AoMs form themselves in
an AoD and this allows them to maintain a direct political connection with the larger
District of Juan Espinoza Medrano as a whole (Figure 9).

Figure 8: Political Relationships between Villager, Locales, and District/Village
Authorities
For example, during this research the migrants of Calcauso had an assembly to
organize a caravan of representatives to attend the official meeting about the mining
decision in the village. As the president of the assembly said during this important
organizing meeting,
“The agenda today is about the mine, we need to send a commission that will
participate in the community, so one member from each family needs to travel or
if not they have to chip in for a bus ticket for others.”
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The community of Calcauso used to be just an annex of the district of Juan Espinoza
Medrano, but in recent decades its status changed and it became a centro poblado
(incorporated town) with its own mayor and local administration. This benefitted both the
district Juan Espinoza Medrano and the village. Another participant said, “The creation
of the centro poblado was with the decisive intervention of the migrants...it was the
decisive part of the organization of migrants in Lima that intervened for the community
[in this regard]”. An influential member of Calcauso explained the function and
relationship with the President of the community as a mayor of the incorporated
township.
We have different functions. The mayor just governs the urban center and must
respect the rights of protection [of the community] or help develop the urban
center and manage projects and meet with the other district and provincial
mayors. [This] while the President of the community represents the whole
territory, so there can be conflicting problems between communities and the
President would be called [for example].
In the community of Mollebamba the Presidential election is quite different from
Calcauso because the migrants in the locale do not participate actively in voting for the
President of the community, just in the mining negotiations or any other problem where
the community needs to have coordination with the migrant communities. According to
the former President of the community of Mollebamba:
We have two types of members of the community: the active community member,
and inactive community member. The active community member is one that lives
in the village and participates in the labor, assemblies, and whose vote is
officially registered. An inactive community member is someone from the village
that mostly does not live in the village and does not participate in the assemblies
or work. In this case, an inactive community member can give their opinion in the
assembly when they are here in the village, but their vote doesn't count, they can
only participate and make suggestions.
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Frequency and demographics of village assemblies
During my in-depth interviews in the locales, I asked a series of questions about
locale political organization and the results indicated that locale politics is highly
influenced by the variables of age, gender, and village of origin and the generation gap is
pronounced. Different generations have varying perspectives regarding mining, whether
migrants living in the capital of Lima should play an active role in village politics, and
carry authority inside of the village. Aside from the interview data, the survey questions
yielded important results about individuals participating in these organizations. These
included: (1) whether they had had a position of authority inside of the locale, (2) how
often they participated in the meetings of the locale, (3) whether they believed that the
authorities were working for the benefit of the village, (4) whether they believed that land
titling was beneficial for the village, (5) whether they participated in the village
assemblies or not, and (6) whether they believed that village migrants should have had
more rights in the decision-making process for the villages than the migrants of the
locales.
The results for the first dependent variable of the surveys indicated that the
younger the respondent, the less likely they were to have had a position of authority in
the locale.10 When the results were divided by people over and under 40 years old it
became clear that 100% of respondents over 40 years old had held a position of authority
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The dependent variable have you ever had a position of authority in the political organization of the
locale strongly showed that age was the most important factor with a Pearson Correlation value of -0.69.
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in the assembly, while only 23.1% of respondents under the age of 40 have ever had a
position of authority in the assembly (Figure 50). Likewise, 68.2% of people who
responded to my survey participated regularly in the locale. However, the younger a
person was, the less likely they were to participate in the locale assemblies (n= 44; r =
.545).11 Only 72.7 % of respondents (n= 44) who were less than 40 years old indicated
they participated in the locale in Lima, while 93.8% of respondents over 40 said they
participated. These observations are important in order to elaborate on the generation gap
later in the Discussion chapter of this thesis.
Assembly decision-making process
Much like its political organization, the assembly decision-making process is very
similar to that of the villages. As compared with Mollebamba where only active village
members can vote, the fact that the community of Calcauso used to have a strong
relationship with the migrants is evident in the active participation in the decision-making
process of the migrants; they are allowed to vote in elections regardless of being an active
village member or not. One participant from Calcauso said, "Always migrants from
different cities vote for the President [of the village], in Arequipa, Lima, Abancay, Ica,
etc.”
In the community of Calcauso the participation for the election of the President of
the community was always through direct vote. The migrants had the ability to participate
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For the second dependent variable how often do you participate in meetings or gatherings of migrants in
the locale, age was the most important independent variable. It showed a Pearson Correlation value of 0.545.
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in votes in order to elect the President, but this right was not legally documented. It was
an informal rule that was agreed upon by the assembly. Due to the arrival of the mining
companies, land titling, and formal regulation, by 2016, this type of informal agreement
could not continue anymore in the community of Calcauso. A different individual from
migrant community (Lima) explained:
All of this regulation has come since the mining companies arrived in the region.
Before we always voted for the President of Calcauso from Lima and we would
send an official to say who the winner in Lima was so they can add in the total
amount of votes for the President of the village. [We are] always in
communication [with the village] and this has always been the case since we have
had our organization in Lima, but now it is totally changed. The communities
need to be very formal and in Abancay the review of the signatures of the
volunteers is more regulated… However, as migrants we make mistake too
because we could have registered everyone so we would not have had this
problem
The formal regulation of the vote affected the relationship between migrants and
villagers. As a result, migrants who live in Lima cannot vote for the President, if they are
not registered as a member of the community.
As an example, the same previous interviewee explained about the votes of the
migrants of the locale from Lima and Ica:
Today votes of the migrants do not count in the Presidential votes in the
community in Calcauso, because when they want to confirm their candidate and
validate the vote of the migrant, there is no account because of the lack of
formalization and registration.
He continued:
Before we always considered the migrants [in Presidential votes] the problem
was to present and put their names in public registers so they can count the
signatures there. In Lima there is a total of 200 signatures that are not in the
legal register.
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One individual from locales explained that it was the lack of coordination and work in
locales, where migrants needed to register their names with the address of their home
village, even if they lived in Lima most of the year. This was in order to have the
signature recognized, so there were a lot of signatures from Lima and many of them were
not recognized as members of the community on paper. In other words, their vote was not
valid until they had registered because they did not have the address to participate in any
kind of votes in the villages. One interviewee from Calcauso talked about his own
personal situation:
I have an address in Calcauso and I can go to vote there when I want. Even
though I have lived in Lima more 20 years I changed my voting address to
Calcauso [so I can vote in elections] for President or Mayor, etc., so my vote for
the president of Calcauso is valid!
The third question focused on whether respondents said they felt that village
authorities work for the benefit of the village. In the analysis, the most important
independent variable with a Pearson Correlation value of 0.578 was village of origin.
Migrants from the village of Mollebamba were more dissatisfied with their village
authorities than those of Calcauso (Figures 50 and 51). In fact, not one person agreed
with this statement from Mollebamba and 70% either disagreed or strongly disagreed,
whereas in Calcauso those who agreed and disagreed were equal, with the other 46.7%
remaining neutral. This may have been due to the communities’ recent experience of
negotiating with the mining companies, a process in which Mollebamba is farther along
than Calcauso, as will be elaborated on in the following section about Negotiation with
Mining Companies.
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The results of the fourth question, whether respondents believed that land titling
is beneficial for the community showed that the most important independent variables
were village of origin and age.12 There was a slightly positive correlation for both of
these variables, indicating that the older a respondent was, or if the respondent was from
Mollebamba, they were more likely to disagree that land titling is beneficial for the
community (Table 5). This is an interesting result considering the fact that Mollebamba
had just gone through the land titling process with the State, this will be explored further
below.

Table 6: Belief that land titling is beneficial for the community
Demographics
18-39
40+
Calcauso
Mollebamba

Agree/Strongly Agree
43.8%
14.3%
40.0%
25.0%

Disagree/Strongly Disagree
43.8%
42.9%
33.4%
62.5%

Connection to the villages in JEM
The relationship between migrants of the locales and the villagers of the village
are political, cultural and economic. A very influential member of the governing
authority in Mollebamba, explained how his locale and village of origin are connected in
these diverse ways:
The social center of Mollebamba was opened up economically many times to
solve these problems of boundaries, especially when we had problems with
Matara [territorial conflict] ... in all these processes the populated center [of
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These factors showed Pearson Correlation values of 0.360 and 0.332.
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Mollebamba] was present, this is information that it is not written, that it is not
stored anywhere, to [help] break down [these issues].
In this way a territorial conflict actually helped the village of Mollebamba develop better
relations with their migrant community, especially after having it strained so much during
their mining negotiation process. In another example from the same interview the
participant continued to explain how Mollebamba helped their locale by offering them a
large sum of money to purchase land in the capital and how this gesture has engendered
more trust and cooperation between these entities.
...the community [Mollebamba] supported us with 100,000 thousand soles [for the
purchase of the land in Lima] we are infinitely grateful and hope that they
continue supporting us because they also have to be aware that here in Lima are
all our brothers who were born there and surely they will continue to come
tomorrow [to Lima] so we need to be strengthened more in infrastructure and in
organization to meet the needs of both [migrant organizations and villages].
The results of the fifth dependent variable about the participation by locale
migrants in village assemblies showed that age was the most important independent
variable. Similar to number two above, this result showed a slight negative correlation for
age, with younger people less likely to participate in village assemblies.13 Men
participated in the assemblies of the locales more than women (Figure 56 and 57), while
younger people (18-39) participated the least (Figures 58 and 59).

Table 7: Participation by migrants in village assemblies
Demographics
18-39
40+
13

Yes
50.0%
94.1%

This factor showed a Pearson Correlation value of -0.41.

No
19.2%
5.9%

Sometimes
30.8%
0.0%
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Demographics
Males
Females

Yes
80.0%
43.8%

No
8.0%
25.0%

Sometimes
12.0%
31.3%

This same trend seems to extend as well to whether or not these migrants have held a
position of authority or not.
Finally, to determine how migrants viewed voting rights in the assemblies,
participants were asked if they believed that villagers should have more rights in the
decision-making process in the village assemblies. The results showed that gender and
age were the most important factors to determine this perspective. These results show a
strong correlation that by being female, or younger, the respondent is more likely to
support this perspective than other migrants.14 People under 40 (64.7%), women (81.1%),
and migrants from Calcauso (66.74%) were the most likely to agree or strongly agree that
villagers should have more rights than migrants living in the locales concerning decisions
in the local political process of the village as seen in Table 6.

Table 8: Villagers should have more authority than migrants
Demographics
Ages 18-39
Female
Migrant from Calcauso

14

Agree/Strongly Agree
64.7%
81.8%
66.7%

Disagree/Strongly Disagree
17.7%
9.1%
20.0%

With Pearson correlation values of -0.578 and 0.5 and an F value over 2.0 is the opinion of locale
migrants about whether villagers should have more rights in the decision-making process shows a strong
correlation.
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Mining Operations
Many migrants of the villages and locales expressed both concern about and
approval of the mining operations, and the negotiations that have taken place in these
communities over mining have been contentious at times. The populations’ opinions
varied by demographics of age, gender, and village of origin. However; overall people
from both villages were more in favor of mining than against it.
Village Perspectives on Mining
The surveys (n=142) showed that a large majority of the people in the villages are
in favor of mining, however they expressed some concerns about environmental and
social impacts of mining, and these seemed to differ based on the various demographic
factors mentioned above. For example, a higher percentage of survey respondents from
Mollebamba than those from Calcauso indicated support for mining near their
community. Of the 48 people who responded to both these questions in Mollebamba,50%
(n=24) were in favor of mining while only 23.0% (n=11) either disagreed or strongly
disagreed with the statement that “mining is a good opportunity for the community” and
the rest of the respondents were neutral 27% (n=13). Calcauso had only 31.2% (n=25)
people in favor of mining while 28.7% (n=23) opposed it. Another 40% (n=33) of the
respondents remained neutral on this question (Table 7).
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Table 9: Comparison between Villages of Respondents’ Perspectives on Mining
Village
Calcauso
Mollebamba

Agree/Strongly
Agree
31.2%
50.0%

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree
28.7%
23.0%

Neutral
40.0%
27.1%

In addition, multi-variance tests of the independent variables gender, age, village
of origin, and whether the participant had lived in the capital or not against the
dependent variable of if the participant believes that mining is a “good opportunity for
the village” revealed that being a woman and/or coming from Calcauso both had a weak
correlation to being against the mine.15
Approval of Mining Operations
Not all villagers, nor Lima migrants, are in agreement however about the negative
effects of the mining operations. When both communities were analyzed, more villagers
(39.4%) seemed to be in favor of the mining operations than against them (25.8%), while
another (34.3%) remained neutral. Those that are predominantly in favor of the mining
operations cite their reasons for this position as including economic mobility,
development, accessibility, and a better education for their children.
One participant from the community of Mollebamba said:
And so, since the year 2000, [the mine] arrived here and pleaded for us to be a
part of the company: Buenaventura Mining, but it was too easy to convince us. Of
course, it works well for the youth because of the jobs... [So] they accepted for the
jobs and not for anything else

At Pearson Correlation values of 0.153 and -0.151 respectively, the respondent’s gender and village of
origin seemed to be the most significant factors determining this dependent variable.
15
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Clearly the main pressure in Mollebamba to accept the mine was about economic
mobility and access to labor opportunities. In fact, most members of the community of
Mollebamba, stated that they approved of the arrival of the mining industry due to the
jobs that it will generate and the potential economic improvement of the village. These
issues seemed to outweigh the other concerns that people had about community and
environment.
In Calcauso, an argument in favor of the mine was that at the time of my
interviews mining had not begun yet. The company representatives said that they were
just doing exploration and prospecting to understand how much, and how many types of,
minerals there were in Calcauso. As one Calcauso villager explained while defending the
decision of the assembly to accept this first stage of the mine:
Unfortunately, we are subscribed to this because there is no work. Thinking in the
village, and many people from Calcauso are students in different cities, there is
no work and for this reason we want to accept the Ares company [the mine]... For
me there is no negative [effects of this first agreement with the mining company],
we just want to know if there are minerals or not. If there are, the mining
company will knock on our door and if we can coordinate with the migrants there,
then we can talk about prices. In this moment we are trying to cut off the mine and
we don’t even know [if there are minerals or not], so we want to know.
Most of the people in Calcauso refer to this same theme, they want to know if there are
minerals or not. So many are in favor of the mining company at least entering the phase
of exploration to find out more information about the minerals and their potential value.
This has created some conflicts with the migrants of the locale in Lima, as one
Lima migrant said, “Obviously there are minerals because otherwise they would not be
[negotiating] for such a long time; besides, there is proof of their investment quantity on
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the internet”. Indeed, according to the article Rumbo Minero (2016), the investment the
interviewee mentioned was on the internet and referred to the “Projecto Corina”, which is
the Ares Mining company’s investment of $4,150,000 in the Calcauso region including
$2 million specifically for exploration. As such, one respondent from Lima said:
There are advantages and disadvantages with the mine. There is development for
the people and there is work for our people. But now as well, we should look at
the environment. Also, worse corruption could present itself and it would make
the [community] organization worse. In all, I am in favor for parts of the first
phase to see if we have minerals or not.
And as another participant added to this that:
[As far as the mine is concerned], for my part we are already old, so we want the
entrance of the mine… our age is approaching us, and the resources will remain
for future generations but we don’t deserve anything? Well, we got together [the
elders] and we decided that the mine should enter. Maybe there will be
production or maybe not, but we want to know.
One of the main disagreements between villagers and migrants was that villagers
wanted to at least do exploration and see how much mining potential there was, while
migrants in Lima believed that company would not be approaching the village, if they
were not already sure there were minerals to be had, and wanted to agree on payment
from the mining company first. These types of disagreements have created some strain on
the village and locale relations as one woman mentioned, “...before there was more
agreement between the members of the population on decision-making... now we are not
in agreement.” These disagreements can lead to strategic manipulations by the mining
companies in order to obtain the acceptance of the mine by the population.
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Concerns about mining operations
Those in the villages that were against mining expressed concerns about the
environment, the local moral economy, uneven economic development, the weakening of
family and community socio political ties, and cultural losses. Locale migrant explained
her fear for the environment:
For me the mining operation is negative because in the first place I don’t know in
what condition it will be in because I see on television in other places and regions
that many suffer. I have seen on television, of course not in my real life, how the
animals suffer with this contaminated water, animals die, plants, even oneself,
even the air becomes difficult. So, the community doesn’t think about this and I
am against that.
This respondent continued, expressing her concern as a migrant in Lima for her home
village and indicating the deepening political divide between village and locale, “For
this reason we, the migrants [of Lima], are opposed to the mine because we see the effect
of the mine everywhere. The community of Calcauso sometimes does not use its reason,
they don’t think because they want money”. Another interviewee, this time a woman from
Calcauso echoed these concerns about the loss of the moral economy,
I don’t want the mine to come, it will be worse for our animals, our fields, our
children...if the mine comes the people will just want money and the new
generation will suffer… The authorities are fighting in the assemblies, some say
that there should be a mine and others say no, but [the migrants] from Lima they
don’t want the mine here. If it were not for Lima there would already be a
mine...here [Calcauso] they just accept and don’t think about the future. Because
of the money, everyone just wants rice and noodles with this program that brings
food [government program], they don’t eat natural food anymore and have turned
into lazy people.
One individual from Calcauso,
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As far as the economy is concerned it’s possible it will get better, but also not
really if they are going to submit to exploitation, then there will be a tremendous
amount of corruption in the community.
Another common concern was that mining would not benefit the elderly and
women in general as much as other groups in the community. As one woman from
Mollebamba said,
The elderly people are complaining and the authorities don’t say anything and the
young people are accepting [the mine]. The elderly people and the women do not
agree with [the mine] because with the mine unknown people will arrive in the
village, thefts, pollution so how is [the mine] going to benefit us? They will not
even give us a job.
This same concern was echoed by another woman, “With the mine, we women do not
benefit because what job are they going to give us?” Several women interviewed were
concerned about having enough money for their children’s education. Though many of
these women were against the mine in principle, because of these types of economic
necessities, they often still said they would want to work in the mine if they could. This
was challenging for them, because the company asked for special work permits and
certifications that these women from the village did not have in order to get most jobs
that they could qualify for with the mine. The jobs for women in the mine are limited and
normally do not extend beyond on cooking and cleaning, however ever for this there are
special permits. The restrictions, lacking licenses and permits necessary to work in the
mine all make this a painful of experience for these women. Not only are they excluded
from the labor force of an industry they didn’t really want in the first place, they are also
left with little to no access to provide a better life for their children. As one woman
explained,
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Sometimes necessity forces you right? My children are studying and I need
money, but now they ask for certificates to work so they don’t want to accept you.
For example, I wanted to help in the kitchen, but I don’t have a certificate so they
didn’t give me the job. They told me, ‘You have to have a certificate’...this can
demoralize you sometimes. We are peasants and we don’t have these papers. So
now another cook from another location will come and it doesn’t make sense.
Some of the concerns about mining operations in the community of Calcauso also
bring with them hopes for something better. Many people I interviewed contrasted the
potential for positive economic and technological development with the possible negative
environmental impacts to the lands of the community. As one interviewee said,
There are two points that make us think: on the one side many people say that
mining companies bring development and the other side says they bring
corruption and will leave our region completely dismantled, polluted and [it will
be] a tremendous disaster
The charts below show the responses from the villages of Calcauso and
Mollebamba on a question concerning the perceived effects of the mining operations
(Figures 25 and 26). These figures show that respondents from both villages agreed on
two points: mining will bring more contamination of the environment and cause social
divisions. 92.94% of Calcauso respondents and 89.47% of Mollebamba respondents said
they believed that mining will bring contamination to the village while 77.65% and
48.95% of Calcauso and Mollebamba respondents respectively said they believed that
mining will cause social divisions.
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Figure 9 - Calcauso: What will be the effects of mining?

Figure 10 - Mollebamba: What will be the effects of mining?
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Locale Perspective on Mining
The survey respondents (n=44) from the locales were almost evenly divided
between agreement (35.5%) and disagreement (38.7%) with the mining operations, with
the rest of the respondents (25.8%) remaining neutral. This is a big difference when
compared with the villages where most respondents agreed that mining operations
presented a good opportunity for the villages.
Divided Approval of Mining Operations
The following table demonstrates some of the conflicted views of locale migrants
about the issue of mining. Only 17.6% of young people 18-29, 21.4% of women, and
34.8% of migrants from the village of Calcauso agreed with the statement that mining is a
good opportunity for the village. This, while 50% people aged 30-39, 50% of men, and
37.5% of migrants from the village of Mollebamba agreed with the same statement. The
biggest differences then between demographics in the locales was between young people
and the middle aged generation and between men and women.
Table 10: Belief that the mining operation is a good opportunity
Village
Calcauso
Mollebamba
Male
Female
Ages 18-29
Ages 30-39

Agree/Strongly
Agree
34.8%
37.5%
50.0%
21.4%
17.6%
50.0%

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree
43.5%
25.0%
37.6%
42.9%
47.1%
16.7%

Neutral
21.7%
37.5%
12.5%
35.7%
35.3%
33.3%

Curiously, in addition to these results, 36.8% of young people 18-29, while
statistically more likely to express opposition to mining, said they would be willing to
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return to their villages to work for a mining company if a decent job presented itself. The
older generations 30-65 seemed more apprehensive about returning with 66.7% of
respondents answering “Maybe” and only 14.3% of respondents answering in the
affirmative. These divisions in the community over the mine became more apparent
during the negotiation process with the mining company in Mollebamba and Calcauso.
Concerns about Mining operations
Interestingly, 50% of migrants from Mollebamba, where mining activity is
already taking place, agreed or strongly agreed that mining would be negative for the
environment compared to 70.8% of migrants from Calcauso.
Table 11: Belief that mining would be negative for the environment
Village
Calcauso
Mollebamba

Agree/Strongly
Agree
70.8%
50.0%

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree
29.1%
37.5%

Neutral
0.0%
12.5%

71.4% of women and 73.9% of migrants from Calcauso reported that they agreed
or strongly agreed that mining is causing divisions in the community, while only 56.3%
of men and 37.5% migrants of Mollebamba felt the same way.
Table 12: Belief that mining is causing division in the community
Village
Calcauso
Mollebamba
Male
Female

Agree/Strongly
Agree
73.9%
37.5%
56.3%
71.4%

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree
17.3%
37.5%
37.5%
7.1%

Neutral
8.7%
25.0%
6.3%
21.4%
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Negotiation Process
Manipulation by the mining companies
The tactics and strategies the companies used in the negotiation process caused
strong discomfort for people who were not allied with the mining operations, and this
caused some community divisions. People from the village noticed the strategies of the
mining companies, but because they saw the need for the mining jobs they did not openly
criticize the companies as they normally would have. The tactics used by the mining
companies included bribery, corruption, and enticements. It was very common for mining
companies to sponsor large parties and festivities in villages throughout the region. As
one woman from Mollebamba explained, "For the festivities [the] mining [company] was
more pompous with their party, they had many beers [to offer] as if they are
economically supporting the community.” There were also times where the engineers
from the mining company came to the village and they invited people who were there to
have food and drink with them. Customarily, when someone invites others in this way, no
one can refuse, especially if they need the food. Many of these poor communities were
not able to offer something as small as a soda or snacks to their visitors, and if somebody
gave them such things, especially in a large public display, it made that person or
organization look good. The villagers who received these gifts felt that they were
obligated to provide a gift in return. As one man from Calcauso explained:
The mining companies always weaken the village so they enter first, as you see
when someone arrives they always have on their side soda and they give jobs, all
of this is an influence that weakens the village. We all need to work, but do we
need the contract the mining company is going to offer afterwards?
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As the woman cited above said about the first phase negotiation:
We were only 12 people against the mine, the whole world was [in favor] of
relations [with the mine]. [Social workers] were going by night teaching people
to sign this because, ‘We are going to give this and that, you will have money and
work’ the people were saying. These [social workers] are prepared to cheat the
ignorant people who do not know how to read and don’t even know their rights.
So, they cheated them like this: in the first little group they organized to sign it
was all women from the upper neighborhood, they convinced them and they made
a line to receive [gifts]...After they began to sign [the contract] they gave them
barbecue, beer, and soda. This day I cried of grief...This is how they convince the
people!

Not only were food and drink used to bribe people of limited economic resources,
but possibilities of employment were held out. This respondent questioned though,
whether this would all be worth the potential mining contract and subsequent disruption
of the community and environment it might cause in the future.
Additionally, in the assemblies it was becoming more complicated to talk about
mining issues because people would identify who was in favor of mining and who was
not. Unfortunately, in these villages if someone was against mining, it did not look good.
As a villager from Calcauso said in the assembly “The mining company says that ‘We
know who are with the mine, each one has been counted up’. What is this? This is a
threat to frighten the people.” This seemed common in the community of Calcauso, while
in the community of Mollebamba people spoke more openly about mining in the
assemblies because they understand better now the pros and cons through their own
experience working with the mining company, and they therefore accepted other
opinions. Furthermore, in the village of Calcauso where the mining company was trying
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to gain access, people said they felt shy to talk in the assemblies against the mining
operations, especially if they did not have support. As one woman interviewed said “[As
for] the mining company being in the assemblies...The truth, I realized, is that because of
fear, nobody will say anything.” Furthermore, people did not seem convinced by some of
the claims of the mining company that promised they would do restoration work and they
would return the land to its natural state. Respondents said they felt that the company
tried to convince people with these arguments, but there were many people who believed
this was cheap talk. As one interviewee noted:
It is 100% [guaranteed] that it will not be exactly the same. Sure, they will try to
do some planting, for example Buenaventura is planting some hay...how many
times have they planted and taken it out [early] because of no return? Apparently
they planted in a field which they had disturbed from its original soil...they plant
with hay, but it doesn’t take, not even if you till 1000 times. This first place made
us think that they will leave our territory a total disaster.
Acceptance of the Mine in Mollebamba
In the village of Mollebamba the change of traditional sociocultural values were
noted by many interview participants. People have become more individualistic focusing
on their own benefit more than that of the whole village and this is causing people to
forget about their traditional concern for the environment. As one woman interviewed
said:
The mine has cheated the people a lot, the community is very petty now, it has
divided the people, all of this money...our nature, our mountains, will be left as a
bare desert, there will not be animals like we have now. Where will the new
generation go?
Despite these concerns from the opposition voices in the village of Mollebamba
during and after the negotiation process, the community was mostly in favor of mining at
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the time of the negotiation, and the first phase was accepted by the assembly in a vote. In
recent years, after the first phase of the mining process, people have become more aware
of the situation and they have a higher level of understanding of the negative effects
mining may cause to village society and the environment.
Mollebamba halts mining exploration: Conflict in Parajinos
As it turned out, in the community of Mollebamba the mining was stopped after
approximately seven years because of a conflict called Parajinos. This conflict started
when the community noticed that some members of the community who had land
(estancias) that the community allowed them to utilize for pasturing their animals
received money from the mine. In that area of the village, families had rented these
village lands intended for grazing to the mine. Furthermore, the mining company bought
all the animals that were occupying these lands for a very high rate, and they paid each
family that had animals in this place on behalf of the community. Other community
members noticed when those people who lived in the area suddenly improved their
economic status. By singling out a few families on communal land, the mining company
representatives were not acting in good faith to negotiate with the village as a whole.
Members of the community noticed and opposed this lack of moral professionalism. As
one person interviewed said:
One group of community members [about 40] and about three to five individuals
[from the mine], created this situation to benefit themselves and forget the rest [of
us]. There the problem was born, where specifically in our agreement with the
company, they had to do planning, organization and relocation and they did not
fulfill this. For those same villagers who have benefited from de-ranging
[moving] their animals to other far locations [and leasing their lands to the
mine], they have come to increase overgrazing in other places and that generates
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more division and conflict. That paradoxical problem against the rest of the
community is where the conflict with the company is born. The community now is
at the dialogue table and we are in favor of a harmonious solution, I think there is
more confidence nowadays.”
In this sense, the conflict of parajinos was the main problem that created division
in the village of Mollebamba, indeed the mining company’s representatives were still
trying to negotiate with the community during the time of this research. Unfortunately, it
was proving to be very complicated to fix the problem that was created by the mining
industry in this area, however it was serving as a wonderful test of the resilience of local
political organization in these villages. As one woman said:
More than anything we want to know how much they [the mine] have given the
parajinos and they don’t want to tell us how much they gave...Now we have been
coming to dialogue for more than four years...There will be a meeting on the first
Sunday of August to see if they want to continue, we are asking for a high sum, if
not they can close [the operation] to open an artisanal mine, but I don’t know
how we are going to achieve this, our President is a little bit weak.”
Strained relations between locales and villages
Participation of the migrant community (locales) for both villages during the
negotiation with the mining companies was strained due to a lack of consensus-building
between the villager assemblies and the migrant assemblies. However, even through this
difficulty, the migrants and villagers maintained their political structure and deep
connections. This can be seen in the constant communication between the two bodies and
the sending of delegations from the locales to vote and participate actively in key
assemblies. The Lima migrants also supported the villages in many ways through their
professions for those who worked in the area or in the city or through the access to
resources that they had.
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The disagreements between the locales and villages increased when the migrant
community in Lima sent a document to the Congress complaining to the Engineer from
the Ministry of Mining and Energy and explaining about the disagreements over the
mining process in the village. This action caused much consternation within the village,
which was precisely in the middle of its negotiations. A woman close to the negotiations
detailed:
The migrants sent two documents to Congress and the Ministry of Mining and
Energy without consulting the main political body in Calcauso, and why did they
do this? “We love Calcauso” so they say, but this is not the case. If they [the
migrants] sent these documents because they love their village, first they should
have consulted the main political body and if we accept, they can do it.
Unfortunately, they just did it as they pleased. So, Calcauso told them they must
come and apologize so that this does not happen again. Our children that come in
the future could do the same if we don’t give a penalty.
As explained above, this type of sentiment was common among many of the villagers.
Finally, even though there was a lack of communication at times between the
villages and the locales, Lima migrants felt as if it were their duty to participate in the
local politics and decision-making process of the village and the villagers welcomed their
help, they just did not want it to be for selfish reasons. As one man said:
We want the support of our migrant brothers and that they support us not only
when the [mining] company comes, but also we need economic support to search
for engineers to make use of the territory. The new generation does not know that
we border with other [Communities] and what we want from the migrant brothers
is to know our [territorial] boundaries.
The territorial problem between different communities was one of the other most
important issues for the community of Calcauso at the time of this research and they
wanted the support of the migrants for that.
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It is important to acknowledge that in the first negotiation with the mining
company, in the community of Mollebamba, the villagers had a strong disagreement with
the migrant migrants in Lima. This disagreement eventually led to the village accepting
an agreement with the mining company that they later regretted. Years later they would
ask the migrants for their expertise in forming a new agreement with more favorable
terms. When asked about this conflict between villagers and migrants, one interviewee
explained in detail,
We made an agreement in 2011 and it was in favor of the company, also here
[there was a] mistrust on the part [of Mollebamba] [towards] the migrants of
Lima, [the community of Mollebamba] did not allow their participation in the
agreement that we were going to make and now we have permitted it only recently
in 2014. For that reason, the communal directive was changed in that we have
requested migrants of Lima, as we have professionals in each town, and as we
have already recognized our error, that we need our professionals to guide us.
[The migrants] came and read the 2011 agreement where they observed
everything was in favor of the company, we the authorities recognize [the error].
Sometimes in the assembly the majority rules ... so [in this moment] the young
people [wanted] opportunity to work and they voted in favor of the opening of the
mining company, so they settled on Milloccucho [the new mine].
This situation occurred because of an initial disagreement between villagers and migrants
and this was the same thing that was happening in the community of Calcauso during the
time of this research. In Calcauso the villagers had a disagreement with the migrants in
Lima because the migrants had been trying to stop the mining company from accessing
village lands or to at least negotiate better terms. This disagreement led to some decisions
that were taken by the village assembly regarding the mine where the villagers and
migrants disagreed strongly.
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Despite these initial differences in Mollebamba, the negotiation seemed to have
improved during the time of this research, because the village\ requested the professional
participation of the migrants to help the community have a better negotiating position
with the mining company.. As one community leader said:
So, from the moment they have observed through the professionals from Lima the
[migrants] have positioned themselves very differently. It did not suit the company
to have that work paralyzed. For four years now we have been in full dialogue,
and now at least with professional advice. I hope we can reach an agreement
because we are not so convinced of what we proposed [before] because of all the
consequences that can be left to the community as regards environmental impact.
In the case of Calcauso, where the mining company was only beginning negotiations, the
migrants and villagers had strong disagreements. Migrants seemed to worry more about
the environment and the cultural changes in the community. As one locale migrant from
Calcauso said:
What we want are fair and equal negotiations so that there is social harmony
because the mine, like any other activity, is not the problem. The problem is how
the mine operates, who should benefit from the mine to not generate social
problems. What we migrants search for is balance and equality in participation,
the mine should also play its social responsibility like it has to make some
mediated programs [in the short term] and in the long term a sustainable
program for 50 to 100 years for our new generations within reason because once
they extract our riches, the mine is no longer viable and it will leave our land
scorched and polluted; this is the danger that is looming for our community.
Migrants from Calcauso and Mollebamba were the most in disagreement on the
question whether ‘political organization is beneficial to negotiations with the mines,’
with a negative correlation for AoM participants from Mollebamba, the village where
mining negotiations already had taken place (Figures 56 and 57). Therefore, it seems that
as negotiations progressed, many migrants felt left out of the process and were thus not
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satisfied with the current state of political organization among their communities. Indeed,
mining operations have influenced much political, social, and economic change in these
communities, changes that are, unfortunately, not always for the better.

Mining’s Effects on CPO, Community, and Local Economy
The mining operations have made such an impact in these villages that there were
noticeable effects in many aspects of the CPO, community, and local economy. Some of
these changes included a weakening of the CPO relationship between the villages and
locales, an increasing generation gap, and a loss of the traditional moral economy.
Customary Political Organization (CPO)
The effect of mining on customary political organization (CPO) and vice versa
can be grouped primarily in three broad themes: the weakening of CPO ties between
villages and locales, corruption of the authorities, and land management. Mining was also
affecting the political landscape and the traditional land titling process through the
encouragement of capital investment strategies by the government, which was creating a
less cohesive political organization in the community that was more susceptible to
individual land divisions of traditionally communally-held lands. Here, I will briefly
explain each of these themes while showing evidence from the interview data in the form
of participant quotes.
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The weakening of customary political organizational ties.
The political organization of the indigenous people of what is today Peru has a
long history that predates the Spanish colonial times and was suppressed during the
colonial period as detailed previously in the Context/Background chapter. Furthermore,
in the 1980’s the Shining Path severely weakened the political structure in Indigenous
communities. One interviewee from Mollebamba explained how the community became
divided and lost trust in the authorities, and some individuals in particular who agreed to
the mining operations. She stated that:
In different places I have heard that [villagers] will be fighting [about the mine]
while the President of the community is taking money [from the mine] under the
table. People have told me this in various locations and this will never see the
light of day because this is hidden...also because they are safe and assured while
we are fighting among ourselves, this continues until now.
According to the surveys in the locales, 65.2% of all respondents see their
connection to the villages as “moderate”, while 16% and 37.5% of respondents from
Calcauso and Mollebamba respectively felt that their relationship was “weak”.
Interestingly, Mollebamba, where the mine had already been developed for more than
fifteen years, reported one instance of selfishness regarding the relationship between
villagers and locale migrants, while 16.0% of respondents from Calcauso reported that
the relationship was “strong”, but the mine appeared to be changing that (Table 11).
Table 13: Perceptions of villager and migrant relations
Village
Strong Relationship
Moderate Relationship
Weak Relationship

Calcauso
16.0%
68.0%
16.0%

Mollebamba
0.0%
62.5%
37.5%
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This will be touched on again in the Discussion chapter while exploring the theme
of the psychological pressure of modernization. Finally, 44.4% of respondents agreed that
external factors like mining were the principal causes for weakening political
organization in the community. Among respondents, 15.91% said that they believed that
globalization/neoliberalism (i.e. the opening-up of domestic markets for exploitation by
foreign governments and companies) was the second major factor causing a weakening in
the relationship between migrants and villagers (Figure 43).

Figure 11 - Weakening relationship between villages and locales.
Corruption of the authorities
The corruption of the authorities, and the people in general, concerned migrants of
the locales and also the members of the villages. Unfortunately, the authorities were not
as respected as in the past. This situation created less trust of the leaders by people in
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their own assemblies. Furthermore, increasingly people began to want to serve as an
authority in the village just because of the economic connection opportunities and not to
benefit and further the community. This trend began in the communities with the arrival
of the mining industry arrived and has only magnified since then. As one respondent
from Mollebamba said, "...they [the ancestors] worked for the love of the village and the
people, not for the economy like today; now just for money people want to be President
[of the community]”. Most members of the community highly agreed that the authorities
were receiving some kind of economic benefit from the mining companies and this
situation created disagreement and less social cohesiveness and respect for their own
authorities. One member of the community of Mollebamba explained it like this:
So what happened with these people? With the President, Vice President, Fiscal
Secretary, [the whole administration], I believe they have been receiving
[payoffs] because I see them doing well economically...some of them received
[payoffs], others were forced by the mining company to sign [the contract] in
Abancay [the regional capital], so they will have given them [payoffs].

A similar situation occurred in the community of Calcauso where conflicts started
after the mining company arrived in the village and began trying to gain the acceptance
of the community. The community decided by majority, in the assembly by a public vote,
to accept the mining enterprise. In recent negotiations with the mining companies, the
authorities found that some signatures had been given without the permission of the
people in the community or assembly. Later the community realized that the negotiations
had already been completed between the mining company and the authorities of the

116
community. At that point, the conflict in Calcauso against the authorities started.
According to one interviewee from Calcauso:
Just recently what happened was that the authorities signed [the mining
contract]. Why did they sign!? We think they gave [the authorities] some amount
under the table. How much could they have given them? While us, who are we?
…So since this moment the divisionism has arrived.
Participants in both communities and their locales strongly agreed that the
corruption of the authorities and members of the communities was the most negative
impact since the mining industry had arrived in those communities. As a result, there was
less trust of the community toward their own authorities. The primary ways that the
mining companies brought corruption to village political management was through the
weakening of customary political organizational ties, land management and titling
disagreements, and through manipulative strategies.
People of the locales related this corruption to the corruption at the national and
state levels, they feared this type of corruption was now coming to local communities. As
one migrant community member explained:
We are in this problem that we don’t want the national scale corruption of the
country to be repeated [here]... so this situation has already created a culture of
authorities like this and I believe the people that want to become authorities
already have more of an economic vision not to serve [or guide] the people
Conflict between locales and villages
As touched upon above, the conflict between the two villages I researched started
at the beginning of the mining operations in Mollebamba. The primary concern at the
moment of this investigation was that the surrounding communities’ traditional land
management was being affected by mining development, so villagers had started to
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mobilize to not sell land to the mining company. One respondent from the community of
Mollebamba explained how this began:
They [the mining company] told us they would give us such and such
amount...there were two proposals: one to sell and one to rent what was
convenient for the community. Well, many people almost wanted to accept selling,
luckily the information spread to the neighboring villages. Vito, Calcauso, Silco
all came as a commission to [protest], so it was accepted to just rent [the land].
At the same time, people from the community of Calcauso complained about the
decision-making process in Mollebamba which had not allowed the participation of the
other communities such as Calcauso. This was especially offensive to Calcauso as it was
the village primarily affected by these land developments, because the river that runs by
Calcauso was expected to be the first to witness contamination. Calcauso is closer to the
initial brunt of potential contaminated river exposure and thus wanted to be consulted. A
member of the village of Calcauso explained the disagreement:
Mollebamba went ahead without consulting us, and we are the first ones affected
by the [headwater] contamination, flora, fauna, plants, trout, and animals are in
at risk of being polluted...they did not give us the ability to participate in the
assemblies when they [Mollebamba] had a meeting with the company
Buenaventura...so they just did this internally without even consulting at least
with their children who are residing in Lima and other cities...Mollebamba
regrets [this decision] now that the mine has finished with the exploration of
about 10 years... now recently [Mollebamba] has consulted with the migrants of
Lima and now they say, “The [the mine] cheated us terribly”, and they have
recently suspended [the company] and now they are in constant renegotiation.
In the first round of negotiation in the community of Mollebamba, the migrants
had less participation because the village disagreed with the locale’s participation in the
negotiation with the mining company. This was because most of the migrants were not
allied with the mining company and it would take more time for the consensus process
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between these two groups to be carried out properly. It takes time to coordinate and reach
consensus between two organizations through this type of CPO, which requires a highlevel of direct democratic participation to be successful. As one interviewee said, “In
reality, thanks to Calcauso, when Mollebamba signed [the contract] an organization
came to make mitin [protest]”
Land management
Land management in the villages was based on the traditional reciprocal work of
ayni, minka, and chaqma described in the Literature Review chapter, which helped
develop social relations between members of these communities. Furthermore, a very
important responsibility of the village authorities was to help manage the land. The
traditional work that had been practiced for millennia in these communities was changing
rapidly during recent years as the amount of mining increased in these places. Because of
different land use norms and patterns held by the mining companies, some villagers were
concerned that the land practices that had sustained them for so long would soon be in
jeopardy. As one respondent said:
Speaking about the community of Calcauso, we rotate the ‘chaqma’ (community
field planting), every year we designate a new site...the land has to rest 4 to 5
years and after that we rotate it again through the community. Each community
member gets two years [of use], the first year [they plant] potatoes, the second
year vegetables...when we do this process of exchange between community
members we call it ‘comiso’. And to care for [these lands and their crops] we call
‘camayoc’.
This statement showed how intimately connected the people of the village were with the
land that they cultivated. It also showed the extreme lengths they went to ensure equal
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use, equal labor, and equal benefit by all members of the community of this land. The
fact that the words for these practices are mostly all words from Quechua is important to
note linguistically, as words or concepts that come from one culture or language often are
maintained in that same language, especially if no other adequate substitute exists in the
dominant language of the society (Schmitt & Marsden, 2006). This means that these land
practices were most probably of indigenous origin and pre-dated the arrival of the
Spanish and their language.
Furthermore, villagers expressed concern over the loss of family and community
relations due to the mine entering into business in the region. As one Calcauso villager
described when asked about how the mine had changed community relations due to the
influence of money:
Before there was ‘ayni’ (reciprocal work-trade) between 4 to 10 people daily,
now they want to be paid instead. Even the children want money. The local
government program recruits people when there is work and now we don’t work
together in the fields, with this program you recruit people only with money [and
not work-trade].
Another respondent said about this government program:
The program completely corrupts the new generation especially the mothers and
the people that do not dedicate themselves to agriculture. Now they are
accustomed to eating junk food and there is no motivation to plant. Agriculture
has failed with this program and that is why people are sick, they are not giving
natural food to their children.
Respondents indicated that this program that the government brought to local
communities was making people more dependent on outside services and many people
were simply waiting for jobs from this program instead working in their fields to produce
their own food.
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These changes in land management practices in these communities was affecting
free space that they used to have. Traditional communal land management in the
community of Mollebamba close to the urban area has become more private than
communal land. For example, people started to build fences and separate from each other
in order to title lands that for generations belonged to their family. This created conflicts
between families and communities because everyone wanted to build a fence for their
own plot in the village and surrounding areas. As one interviewee from Mollebamba said
“I don’t even have a place to go to the bathroom freely, everything is fenced and walled
in.”
Land titling disagreements
When asked whether land titling is beneficial for the community in the survey,
there were two positions with the villages and locales largely divided. 67.7% of villagers
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that “land titling is beneficial for the
community”, while only 34.7% of migrants agreed with the same statement. Multivariant correlation tests yielded results that showed that village of origin was the most
important independent variable.16 The community had been struggling with the process of
land titling arriving in these communities and it had been a very complex process that
often generated more conflict between families and members of the community. A
former President of the community of Calcauso, said in the assembly that
Titling land [individually] does not benefit our community in the long term,
instead we should find a way to title the whole the village. We know there is
16

Being a villager from Calcauso shows a weak correlation with believing that land titling is beneficial for
the community with a Pearson Correlation value of -0.217.
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pressure by the mining companies to title the land so they can easily enter our
land, because as communally-held land it is harder for them to deal with, but if
everything were private it would be easy to buy those lands.”
A woman from Calcauso manifested her concern about land titling of communal
agricultural fields, "The houses can be titled, but not the fields.”
Some people such as a man interviewed from Calcauso were in favor of land
titling because it would help bring financial structure and authority to people’s property
holdings, this would in turn, allow them to obtain credit from the banks. He said, “Land
titling [can be] advantageous because of the financial security it brings, if you do not
have a title to your property to do a loan with, not having these facilities can be
negative”. Similarly, a man interviewed from Calcauso detailed the debate taking place in
these communities over land titling and the advantages and disadvantages that came with
that:
"Well I think each one has advantages and disadvantages ...we must have our
goods formalized in the urban area to be able to say that this is mine, but in
possession any problem can become worse, for me yes I agree, but also what is
coming suddenly could be the payment of property assessment..[land titling] has
also come out in an assembly for approval ...the whole majority in an assembly
all said ‘Yes’ to [land titling in the urban area] and then COFOPRI [state
property assessment agency] entered Mollebamba, then there was divisionism
[among people who wanted land titling and those who did not] .. some said that ‘I
will not title [my land]’ and there were others who wanted to...so maybe there
was a misunderstanding … [also] possibly the Mayor saw some good benefit for
the population by having a title, for example, if one wanted to participate in the
new roof program [from the State], for me the intention by the Mayor was to see
the people orderly with their land titled”
A man from the community of Mollebamba affirmed that land titling could be good
because it gives individuals control of their own properties. He explained that,
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COFOPRI is good because it will prioritize your right to your house, you can sell
it [for example]...in the indigenous times we paid ‘alcabala’ because we had
some land; my father paid this tax every semester or monthly, when we had
harvests, depending on how much you produced, so you would produce a lot of
food to pay the Velazco government [their taxes].
On the other hand, there were participants from all communities I researched that
were also apprehensive about land titling. For example, a woman from the village of
Calcauso said she believed that the community needed more investigation about this
subject because it was something new for the community and some people did not
understand some of the consequences of these actions. She said:
“Land titling will happen here and I do not know if it will be good because maybe
in the future our homes and things will be seized by the State, I am thinking in the
taxes we have to pay right? We need more investigation about this because if this
happens, we don’t have work as you see [to pay the taxes].”
The vice president of the Community of Calcauso also acknowledged that they needed
more information about this subject. He agreed that:
"We are not well trained about this project from COFOPRI to title lands. Two
years ago [COFOPRI] entered the District [of Juan Espinoza Medrano] and one
year ago they titled Mollebamba, and well this year [2017] other
communities...like in the city, overtime, we will come to pay property taxes to the
State.”
People from the village seemed to understand that they did not have enough
money to pay taxes to the government for the land that they owned, and this was a major
concern about the prospect of land titling. In addition, they were concerned about the
inadequate knowledge that these State institutions operated on about how communal land
functioned in their communities. As a village leader from Calcauso complained:
"We are not in conditions to pay the State for the communal use [of land]...here
they are missing a commission, a Ministry of Agriculture sector, that can look at
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the problems of the communal lands, of titling, and of the urban centers.
COFOPRI comes and they don’t know what to say.”
Another, concern from the people in the villages was that if the land becomes
private it would be difficult to organize the community and people will lose interest in the
communal assemblies and duties in the community. As one woman said,
There are people that want to privatize here, there should be no private property
because when there is private property the owner of that land does not want to
hear about anything “communal”...they no longer participate in the [communal]
labor and assemblies.
This point about land titling is important because it affects the ability of mines to
gain access to land, and land titling had already happened in Mollebamba and there were
some disagreements because of this decision, so these results make sense prima facie and
will be explored more below.
Community
The effect of mining on the community of the villages and locales and vice versa
can be divided into two broad themes: how participants would like to see their villages in
the future and a generation gap that was increasing. Moreover, external factors,
encouraged by the entrance of the mining industry were changing village and migrant
socio political relations primarily through the entrance of modern neoliberal values such
us individualism, competition, monetization, and self-interested local politics.
How participants would like to see their village in the future
I asked a question in the survey concerning how the participants would like to see
their village in the future. Figures 44 and 45 show that 62.35% of Calcauso respondents

124
and 73.68% of Mollebamba respondents said they wanted to see their village have a
healthy environment in the future. Needless to say, with most respondents in favor of
mining and simultaneously concerned about contamination of the environment, these
results are curious and will be addressed in detail in the Discussion chapter of this thesis.
Another curious result I will elaborate on in the Discussion chapter, is that it appears that
Calcauso was keen to see more development and economic opportunities while
Mollebamba was concerned about maintaining language and cultural practices into the
future.

Figure 12 - Calcauso: How do you want your village to look in the future?
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Figure 13 - Mollebamba: How do you want your village to look in the future?
Generation gap
As introduced above, there was evidence of a generation gap and various migrants
alluded to the fact that they saw the relationship between generations getting weaker over
time. This was noticeable both in terms of the generation gap and the feelings about
participation in village politics by migrants of the locale. As one man from Mollebamba
said,
There does not exist [political participation] for the new generation...we are
[elderly and] already finished, so I don’t know where the youth that are not
familiar with reality will take us in the end.
The elders were concerned about the lack of emerging leadership among the young
people, because the youth seemed to not listen to advice from the elder generation and the
gap was getting stronger each year. A woman from Mollebamba indicated:

[The new generation] they only search for land [to buy] and look towards the
mine. Before one worked with stones and mounds [for fences] and now only
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barbed wire for everything. There is no space in any parts, everything is with
barbed wire...The new generation eats different than we do [preferring sodas and
sweets] to what we ate before like chuno, lawa, and saralawa thus there was more
respect with the food, the grandmothers and grandfathers were very strong, now
the young people don’t do anything. The situation is complicated here, but it must
be this way everywhere, right?
The elders of the community did not understand why this change was happening so
rapidly. The unwillingness of young people to listen to and learn from stories of the past
in order to plan for the future was not a good sign for the older generation. According to
one elder:

The new generation has over-generalized the past so that for them there is no
past, only the present and the future. ‘The past is already over’, they say, and they
don’t want to know anything about the past...sometimes they just silence us...I just
go to the assemblies, I look, I listen, and sometimes when they say something to
me, I participate. If I participate too long [the new generation] will become
bored.
Local economy changes due to mining
There were some shifts of the traditional economy in these villages toward
consumerism as many of the interviews described. The differences between Mollebamba
and Calcauso were that since the mining had entered Mollebamba more than 10 years
earlier, the economy had changed strongly and many people, especially men, were
working in the mine and not in their own land. This meant that women had to work by
themselves in the field and they could not do that well because much of the work in the
field requires both men and women. It is necessary for both sexes to work because men
can easily till the land with a traditional tool that has been in use since Incan times called
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the chaquitaclla, whereas women usually play the role of planting the seeds and small
plants.
As the people from Mollebamba already had had experiences with mining since
the period of exploration began in the early 2000’s they had faced some significant
changes in the local economy of the village as compared with Calcauso, which had yet to
fully experience the economic effects of the mine, but which was still feeling the social
and economic pressure of these dramatic changes to their neighboring village. According
to my quantitative data, Mollebamba was more concerned about the future generation at
the moment than Calcauso, which was more preoccupied with mining negotiations and
disagreements between villagers and migrants over the future of mining. Some of the
effects of the mining that Mollebamba had seen included a shift in the price of labor and
a loss of the traditional economy, while some of the effects of the mining that Calcauso
had seen included increased social and economic pressure to modernize.
Due to this context with the mining, everyone was only consuming and buying
food from the store. As one interviewee mentioned, “The driver who came with the car to
sell product [told me] he has noticed a strong change before and after the mining
operation as people are just buying food at any price.” It seemed the impact of new foods
and work habits was strongly affecting the community of Mollebamba, which had almost
completely changed their livelihood. The most affected were the elderly due to their
being accustomed to traditional work habits and relations. Because work was such an
integral part of the development and maintenance of social relationships in these
communities, this change was especially dramatic for those members of the community
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that still relied on this type of social organization. There were still people of this older
generation that wanted to maintain this type of traditional local economy that was not
based in money, but in work-sharing and the well-being of all members of the
community.
In Calcauso, with the recent arrival of mining, they were just beginning to face
this type of similar economic pressure and development. As one respondent from
Calcauso said:
“Calcauso is trying to improve putting houses with tin roofs [instead of straw].
Unfortunately, some people are still building the roofs of their houses with straw.
In Mollebamba almost all of the houses have tin roofs and are made of cement
and brick [not adobe].”
Many people that I interviewed made this same observation, that a sign of economic
prosperity from the mine was the structural improvement of people’s homes.
Economic disparity
Through the customary political and labor practices of these villages, major
economic disparity had largely been avoided, until now. The disparity of the distribution
of wealth was the most visible in the town of Mollebamba where before the mining
arrived it used to be more equal. Development used to work for everyone without anyone
taking advantage, but instead helping and sharing with each other. This has been noted
above in regard to the lack of respect for the elders that had emerged where work-sharing
was concerned. Before, when any elderly person wanted support in their land people
would go there and help them without asking for money; instead, the elderly people
would prepare food for the helpers, this is called minka, which is a traditional form of
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work that is slowly disappearing. As a village elder from Mollebamba said: “Minka was
work we did for the elders, for the widows, for those people that needed help from the
population.”
Unfortunately, the new generation are losing these values and the elderly are very
concerned about the loss of these traditions and values that seems to be fading within the
community. As a woman from Mollebamba said:
“When you get older then the people don’t want [to help you]. I didn’t put
anything in the field because it is difficult [there is no one to help]. I don’t know
what I am going to eat, this is why I must go and work. And when I do request
work collaboration they want 50 soles, from where am I going to pay this!? As
elderly people [the government] gives us something and with this I have to
live...some people are developing their houses and they have cars, and for us,
nothing...They all already have a car, those that had their fields close to the mine,
they receive the money, and for us, nothing. This is why we are arguing, because
come are complaining that the mine gave some people a lot of money, and for
us?”

The elderly people were the most vulnerable to these changes because they needed young
people that could help them in the traditional work such as chaqma and minka. Without
this type of collaborative work, it was impossible for the elderly to work by themselves.
The traditional moral economy in these communities was based in the exchange
of product and work that was called trueque. This type of exchange was well known in
the Andes. This happened where people, known as arrieros, from the villages would
travel long distances in order to exchange their products and bring them to the village.
The exchange for this food was usually done with clothing or food that was not available
where the arrieros came from. Through this type of fair trade system, locations with far
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distances between them learned to exchange potatoes with salt or sugar, etc. One man
recounted his memory of the arrieros:
I remember seeing my father three times bring four to five mules...and he would
bring us sugar, noodles, things that did not exist because there were no merchants
like now where you can buy bread. To get bread there were people that travelled
and they brought us [bread and noodles] that is how we came to know about
eating bread and sugar as well.
In this region until the 1980s most of the economy was still based on trueque. In just a
few short years the differences in the economy of this area had shifted completely.
Highways and infrastructure brought a new economy based on monetary value and
because now cars could bring products from the coast or jungle one just needed the
money to purchase them.
Loss of the Traditional Moral Economy
While labor prices increased to around 40-50 soles ($12.37- $15.47) for a day of
work due to the mine’s influence, this was not positive for everyone in the community.
As one village leader said, "With agriculture there is no return anymore because they
[the average worker] charge you 40-50 soles. From where are we going to get this
quantity?” In general, for most workers, it was probably good that wages were rising,
however one village elder was quick to note that, “The elderly are not going to benefit
from this because they can only work at the mine until the age of 50”. Equally, as
mentioned above women have been being restricted from this work due to a lack of
proper certifications or licenses. This means that while the elderly and women will be
excluded from the labor force, the traditional economy that they have relied on for
generations has also been at risk of collapsing due to the lack of enthusiasm for
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traditional forms of work trade like ayni, minka, and chaqma that have been so rapidly
disappearing.
As explained above, ayni, minka, and chaqma were traditional forms of work
trade that Quechua communities engaged for centuries. Most often it consisted of one
person or a group of people helping out another group with certain large projects like
building a home, tilling or harvesting a large field, or some other community project.
These work trades might not be paid back for many seasons or years, but it was one of
the elements that maintained cohesiveness in these villages; if someone owed another
person work in the future, no one was going to try and destroy that relationship through
selfishness, greed, or other negative actions. Thus, the loss of this traditional moral
economy could engender more division in the community. As one respondent stated
simply “Ayni and minka will disappear because people just want money.” This type of
traditional work was explained in detail by and elder from (Mollebamba):
If we bring up the history of these systems of work [ayni and minka] it is the
inheritance of our ancestors, from the Incas this system comes and it worked
perfectly up until I was a teenager. For example, minka was a job for elderly
people, widows, and others who needed help from the population. Ayni was a
reciprocal work trade, today for me, tomorrow for you. Mita was a type of
communal work like for repairing canals, roads, and unfortunately with the
appearance of the mine these systems of work are disappearing...Calcauso has
gone backwards abysmally. For example, the elderly and the widows, among
other populations, are relatively abandoned because everything is focused on
money, in productivity and production.
Another point made by respondents was about people’s attitudes and diets changing with
the loss of this traditional moral economy. When asked about this, Stanis’s wife
responded that. “It is not like before...with the mine they [the young people] have
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changed their attitudes and behaviors for negative ones. The children now are different,
they don’t eat toasted corn anymore, just food from the store.” Another woman added to
this point:
Before in your old age, the youth would help with ayni or any type of reciprocity
work, they would also help without pay, but now everything is paid…’If you pay
me like the mine 40 soles, then I will go to your field’, that is how the new
generation answers [when you ask for assistance], and all this the mine has
caused to change a lot. Now, with the mine, it has corrupted and cheated the
people and exploited the community members...I am always debating in the
assembly because I notice why the community has had their rights cheated,
sometimes because, I am elderly, they tell me, ‘Why do you complain?’
This response helps show that not only are monetary and economic factors important for
the traditional moral economy, but also how the loss of this economy was affecting
people’s attitudes, diets, and village cohesiveness. In many ways, this observation
encompassed the major themes of the changes that are taking place in these villages due
to the pressures of globalization, and especially the local mining industry, including the
generation gap that is forming and the loss of the traditional moral economy.
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Table 14: Similarities and Differences between CPO in Calcauso and Mollebamba
Characteristics
Land Management (Ostrom,
2008)
Institution Type (Pejovich,
1999; Helmke and Levitsky
2004)
Session frequency
Duration of sessions
Assembly frequency
Duration of assemblies
Village authorities
Stage of mining negotiations

Calcauso
Communal

Mollebamba
Communal/Private

Substitutive

Substitutive

Twice a week
2 hours
Every month
2-3 hours
Mostly men aged 30-60
Accepted Exploration
Stage in July 2017

Voting rights

Anyone from the
village or locale
Was strong, but is now
becoming strained due
to differences over
mining negotiations

Twice a week
2 hours
Every month
All day
Mostly men aged 30-60
Completed Exploration
Stage in 2012, currently in
negotiations about the
Extraction Phase.
Only active village
members
Was strained due to
differences over previous
mining negotiations, now
is improving due to
conflict between the mine
and village

Connection to locales
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Chapter 5: Discussion

In this chapter, I will explain how my research results relate to the theories and
concepts presented in the Literature Review. The main ideas discussed here are
indigenous peoplehood (Thomas, 1990; Holm et al., 2003), effective and ineffective
formal and informal institutions (Pejovich, 1999; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004), institutional
bricolage (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012), Ostrom’s (2008) eight principles
of common pool resource management, and the geographic scale of mining negotiation
participation (Muradian et al.,2003).
The complex political structure of indigenous communities throughout the Andes
includes their migrant communities that have helped shape a unique form of organization.
This relationship in recent decades has been disrupted due to different changes and the
entrance of outsider entities such as transnational mining companies that often have not
included these migrant communities’ participation in negotiation processes. As a result,
these communities have seen the weakening of the customary relationship between
villages and migrant communities, which has created more social conflict and less
cohesive political organization even as the long-term negotiation processes with the
mining companies have been underway. Villages seemed to be the most affected by these
negotiations. Examples of this included the division between migrants and villagers,
social hierarchies, environmental destruction and loss of traditions. These situations often
did not ensure wellbeing and a better standard of life for the people, instead it generated
more local political degradation and dependence upon the central government to pursue
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their own development. Based on my interviews, it was clear the values of the authorities
had completely altered because the value of being a village authority or working to
benefit the community was diminishing. Meanwhile the value of wage labor was
increasing. This situation appeared to have created less trust between community
members and their authorities as well as less trust between the villages and locales.
However more studies of other villages with and without mining operations are necessary
to confirm these results. Furthermore, the division and disagreement in the initial
negotiation with the mining companies has created a platform that could end up giving
unequal benefit to the mining corporations because of the lack of agreement and
participation in the bargaining negotiation process by the migrant community and all
members of the villages.
The negotiation process with mining companies takes many years. Calcauso has
been involved in a long process of negotiation that had taken almost one decade since
different companies arrived in the community and tried to obtain the community’s
consent. Obtaining the consent of the community, or the social license to operate, is
where the process of negotiation with mining companies and the relationship with the
community begins (Williams, 2012). This long process of negotiation can generate
political deterioration between different interest groups, such as the villagers and locales,
and this conflict can damage the long term unity of the political organization between
these groups.
In the case of Calcauso, the migrant community used to have a strong relationship
with the village and their participation in the decision making process was always assured
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from the time when the migrant community began their political organization in the city.
This relationship has changed due to the different aspirations and interests of people from
the migrant community and the villages. Throughout my interviews, there was a pattern
of migrants disagreeing more with the mining operation than villagers. However, many
indicated that if the mining operation were to be allowed by the village, then they should
have the best negotiation possible to benefit the community. In complex democratic
organizations, the process of consensus can take longer than in less complex and less
democratic political organizations due to these differences of opinion (Mainwaring,
2006).
Interviews also indicated that public opinion in the District of JEM regarded
Calcauso as having a reputation as a very unified, organized, and cohesive community.
People from Mollebamba recognized that Calcauso has this type of reputation in the
district and in the whole county based on interviews conducted in the summer of 2017.
Even so, the negotiation process that took place in 2017 led to conflict and disagreement
between the village of Calcauso and their migrant community in Lima. Due to this long
process and the uncertainty over what costs or benefits mining might bring, the
assemblies witnessed more conflict between members of the community. Every month in
the assemblies the same problem of mining was discussed, which eventually wore the
community down. In addition, as explained by Williams (2012) above, the strategies of
clientelism, favoritism, and bribery that corporations used to keep the leadership of the
community on their side resulted in a bad perception of the leadership by members of the
community. This change of perception has led to a loss of respect for the authorities, loss
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of self-reliance and more dependence on external factors and institutions in regard to land
management rules under the traditional economy by community members.
My findings are supported by literature suggesting that almost all Andean
communities who have had migrants move to the city have strong political and social ties
with their villages of origin (Wallace, 1984; Adams & Golte, 1990). These relationships
depend on the geographical scale of their population, social values, family ties, and their
customary political organization.

Indigenous Identity
The concept of indigenous identity is poorly understood or developed in these
communities and their locales. Young people with higher education are more likely to
have a contemporary understanding about indigenous identity. According to my
qualitative data, this lack of understanding about the current concept of indigenous
identity is related to language usage and the prejudice against the word “indigenous”.
Furthermore, many participants in my interviews preferred to identify as peasants and
less as Indian, particularly because this word is associated with strong racism. It is an
insult to call somebody indio (Altamirano-Jiménez, 2013).
Through the interviews and survey responses it became clear that the concept of
indigenousness was new for most of the respondents and needed to be explained. For
example, one respondent was asked in the survey if he identified with his indigenous
identity, instead of answering in the affirmative or negative he asked, “What do you mean
indigenous? I heard this term before, do you think we are still indigenous?” These types
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of questions were very common throughout the interviews and surveys. Furthermore,
elderly people were more likely to respond with, “I do not know what indigenous is”.
When I mentioned the term “Indian”, most of them, especially the elders, rejected the
term and some of them explained me in a nice way that “Indians are in the Puna (the
highest and poorest part of the Andes), most of them they do not speak Spanish, and they
lived with llamas and alpacas, so I think we still have some Indian people, but not a lot”.
This situation reflected what is known about the colonial mentality and the influence of
the changes of identity by outsider entities such us the State with the imposition of the
term indio and eventually peasant. As many authors have also discovered, this
manipulation of language and terminology has created much confusion for the indigenous
Quechua of the Andes today (Lobo et al., 2016). Furthermore, even though the traditions,
language, and land practices are still in place, it does not matter for them if legally they
are not recognized as indigenous and cannot receive their due benefits and rights.
Although this research does not attempt to focus on the profound debate about
indigenous identity, it does acknowledge that these communities are indigenous based on
the framework of peoplehood explained in the Literature Review Chapter. According to
the theory of peoplehood, marginalized indigenous peoples can advocate for, and
revalidate, the origins and ethnicity of these communities as an indigenous people due to
their common history, language, cycles of ceremony, and their continued connection
with, and management of, the land they still inhabit (Thomas, 1990; Varese & Chirif,
2006). This interconnected characteristic of the peoplehood theory is manifested in very
consistent ways in these two communities.
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In the context of resources extraction, one member of the village of Mollebamba
noted about this indigenous past, “The mining is not something new since the colonial
times. Our ancestors confronted many abuses due to the extraction of minerals without
any pay, as an example there are places well-known for their notorious exploitation and
physical evidence exists even until today”. Furthermore, these communities have
maintained their cycles of ceremonies through time and space. Although the loss of the
tradition in the recent decades in the district of Juan Espinoza Medrano has increased and
fewer people are practicing ceremonies to the Pachamama such as: waka tinka, and llama
tinka, today most of the people celebrate the ceremonies as part of traditional festivities.
However, it seemed that fewer people continued the traditional practice in their daily life.
The sacred land is also related to certain places considered to be spiritual land; however,
the geographical and physical boundaries of these communities is also legitimately
administered by the members of these communities creating a type of mixed indigenous
Andean and Western liberal model of livelihood and societal management.
It is important to acknowledge in the debate over the future maintenance of the
language the incorporation of modern technologies and the education system to further
the use of Quechua. If this is not done, the new generation will continue losing their
interest to speak their native language especially within the locales of the cities where
migrants often face loneliness, racism, and discrimination. Thus, it is possible that a new
framework is required to define the political organization of these modern indigenous
communities. As some authors (Adams & Golte, 1990; Kirk, 1991; Starn, 1992; Solari &
Jorge, 2008) recognized there are many challenges to develop legal frameworks that
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identify indigenous people who migrate to the city and live far away from their traditional
homeland. Due to economic pressure, these ethnic groups are spatially segregated. This
relationship between villages of origin and migrant communities (locales) deserves
further research. Lobo et al. (2016) framework of ‘ethnopolitical boundaries’, for
example, notes cases in which migrant people still maintain their connection with the
villages, and in the case of not achieving success or accustoming themselves to the city
life, they always have their land that will be a part of them, if they wanted to return again
to their homeland.
This discussion might help with gaining recognition of migrant communities’
indigenous associations. As detailed above, the organizations of migrant communities
were created as informal organizations that today have become legal institutions. These
organizations were capable of incorporating their culture, traditions, and community
awareness through cultural spaces in urban areas, often without any legitimization by the
formal institutions of the state. However, they were able to reclaim cultural significance
and advocate for legal legitimization of their traditional festivities and traditional customs
by migrants through their channels of informal and formal institutions in the city. These
studies suggested that there be more research into how indigenous political organization
functions in different spaces and contexts.

Effective and Ineffective, Formal and Informal Institutions
Throughout the Andes many communities have a direct or indirect relationship
with locales (culturally, politically, socially, etc.). Adams and Golte (1990) discussed
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how rural peasants influenced the process of configuration of the city of Lima. The
institutions in both communities share similarities such as their own statutes and book of
laws that needs to be approved by a sanctioned State institution. As Helmke and Levitsky
(2004) explained, many communities included in this research are recognized by formal
State institutions, though they operate under both written, and at times, informal and
unwritten rules. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the political motivations of
the State and other formally sanctioned institutions toward informal institutions such as
the village assemblies and locales can be dangerous as they may inadvertently cause the
rejection and de-legitimization of any kind of informal organizations. This
dichotomization undermines the customary political organization that informal
institutions often rely on. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) explained that informal
institutions can shape the outcomes of formal institutions, this understanding can bring
other questions such as to what degree these outcomes can be changed, and by
whom? Furthermore, they mentioned that, “We need to know more about what induces
state actors to formalize rather than oppose informal institutions” (Helmke & Levitsky,
2004 p. 734). I hope this study can help actors from formal institutions to understand and
reach out to those from more informal institutions. Doing this would make these formal
State institutions more effective and would enable the informal institutions of these
communities go from being Substitutive institutions to Complementary institutions
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).
In this regard, Ostrom (2010) explained the mechanisms whereby communities
that often rely on common–pool resources (CPR) management create more trust and

142
legitimization of their own organization among members. (Ostrom, 2010) named six
“attributes of micrositutaions” and claimed that they are the primary ways that
individuals develop trust of each other within commonly managed resources (Ostrom,
2010, p. 661). These attributes apply to all communities that practice CPR and include
the need for open communication between members. These attributes include known
reputations and histories of members, high marginal per capita return (MPCR), ability to
enter and exit organization easily, a long-term vision by the community about the use and
benefit of said resources, and a system of rules and penalties. These attributes can help to
bridge the gap of communication that has traditionally existed between indigenous
communities and the State, which often lacks understanding of both the local political
structure and its function in the communities where mining is arriving. By focusing on
developing these attributes, the State could help to build a bridge between formal and
informal institutions that could create more cooperation between institutions. Improving
the relationship between the informal and formal institutions means both recognizing and
increasing the rights of CPR management by the local communities, including control
over their mineral resources while improving the effectiveness of formal institutions in
their communities.
Formal institutions can be made more effective by adhering to and fulfilling the
six clear attributes explained by Ostrom (2010) regarding local community operations
based on trust, consent, and mutual agreement among CPR members. In this sense, it
should also be recognized that informal institutions play a vital role in the management
and use of CPR and thus are equally important stakeholders to the State and the mining
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companies in the difficult and complex decisions about mining and development in these
communities. As these communities have traditionally managed the CPR in a sustainable
manner, it is important for the State and mining companies to assume some of the
attributes of members of these communities by adhering to these guidelines. This seems
to be one of the best proven ways, theoretically and empirically, to generate progress,
trust, and legitimization within the community and among all stakeholders and thereby
ensure the best chance for economic success and prosperity.
Indigenous communities have quite a different organization that includes
traditional and modern mixed components within the political organizations such as
democratic votes, offices of authority, regular assemblies, etc., making it a customary
form of political organization. Meetings, land management, and assemblies are a part of
customary organization that is often not recognized by formal rules or institutions. In
particular, indigenous communities are characterized by their own ethics and rules and
thus have different perceptions of what informality means. However, Helmke and
Levitsky (2004) have formulated some of the key elements of the contrast of the
interaction between informal institutions and effective versus ineffective formal
institutions. This framework shows that these communities are more likely to see
economic prosperity if they can work with effective informal institutions towards
common goals. To this end, the State should work to make their institutions for mining
more effective by making them more responsive and accepting of following the political
rules and norms of the communities in which they operate.
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Additionally, as Williams (2012) and Arellano (2008) mentioned in their studies,
the lack of capacity of the State to create and enforce laws vis a vis companies that are
operating in Peru is often because they favor neoliberal investment, and thus the
mechanisms to control the law over those companies are weak. In this context, informal
rules and procedures of these communities make the changes and demand that formal
rules be put in practice. As both communities rely on informal and formal institutions
that produce rules to manage the resources and society in these communities, it is also
important to recognize that the concept of “informal” institutions is a foreign idea to these
communities, as these communities have been organized this way since before the
colonial times. Furthermore, the idea of the “formal” institution has only been defined as
it relates to modern institutions. Then can we call the institutions of the Inca Empire
formal as well? In this case, these communities have always followed certain formal and
informal rules through their political evolution until today. This ability to adapt local
institutions to larger non-local institutions over time has enabled the survival of many
aspects of Quechua CPO. In the recent context of the entrance of international companies
to these communities, the village and locale assemblies have helped dictate how and
under which conditions these companies can operate.
According to many historical references and the nature of their institutions,
governments have certain interests to regulate and control economic interests within their
geographical boundaries. The incentive in recent decades to formalize informal
organizations is due to the economic interest in control over resources. As mining
companies seek investments in these communities, the formal institutions of the
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government have a major interest in the inclusion of specific laws and recognition of
these communities to ameliorate social conflict and provide less of a barrier to the
entrance of the mining investment in these areas. Because the central government
controls taxes levied on the mining operations, but does not distribute them equally, and
the state government has been focusing on economic interests that make it easier for
corporations to co-opt the government and force them to defend the interests of the
corporation over citizens of local communities, the local village assemblies are not in a
strong position to confront the State and multinational mining corporations. Instead, the
unique shield the community has maintained is their CPO, which has included the
migrant communities. However, as was clear from my interviews, the formal institutions
of the State have attempted to create and implement all forms of rules and procedures to
sanction any informal rules that encourage interaction between migrants and their village.
Because the main economic investment in Peru is heavily dominated by the mining
industry, the formal institutions of the government often help to generate a platform to
support foreign companies’ investments and protect their interests, which are not
necessarily the interests of the communities. The lack of capacity (or desire) by the
government to guarantee the well-being of these communities is one of the main
challenges of the central government. The economic development process is thus often
implemented by ineffective formal institutions that not only operate in a top-down
fashion, but often neglect their duty to advocate on behalf of indigenous communities.
The inability of the Peruvian government to regulate and control the companies
efficiently (and because it appears that is not in their best interest to do so), has reduced

146
citizens’ trust in government and has caused many communities to take on substitutive
roles in advocating for their own proper financial compensation, environmental concerns,
and land management rights and inheritance (Arellano, 2008). Still, even if the State were
to take on a more effective role as a formal institution in advocating for these
communities, we must ask the question: would it really change the economic
development outcome as Pejovich (1999) and Helmke and Levitsky (2004) claim?
Norberg-Hodge (1991) analyzed this question in her book about a Tibetan village
in Ladakh, a village that underwent nearly the same process of change that have
happened to the villages of this study, only in a different context. Economic development,
in the traditional material sense of the term, by a population with no outside influence can
require generations. However, with the active intervention of the State and international
companies the process can be much more rapid. Perhaps they can help to improve the
economic viability of a region; but this does not necessarily guarantee that peoples’
standard of living will improve. These controversial issues are still an active part of the
academic debate and deserve further investigation and analysis. Is the loss of values and
culture worth development? More practically, how can standard of living increase while
still encouraging and enriching local practices, customs, and concerns? What is the role
of formal and informal institutions in this regard? And how can a balance between
economic development based on mining and the political independence, social values,
and cultural well-being of the Andean indigenous communities benefit all actors in this
conflict?
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According to my data, both communities studied here have developed strong
connections as a network with their migrant communities, reproducing their own rules
and statutes. Perhaps this connection with migrant communities can develop positive
outcomes for the community. In the context of indigenous communities in the developing
world, analysis of formal and informal institutions as separate and divergent institutions
leads to missing some of the key elements that make connections between these types of
institutions more holistic. This leads to the theory of institutional bricolage that examines
the different process and arrangement of the rules that communities develop through
time.
Bricolage
“Bricolage addresses the plurality and the complex political dimensions of
knowledge work” (Rogers, 2012. p. 14). This research attempted to understand the
complexity of the political organization of the villages and locales without separating
these institutions from the State government and mining negotiations. Instead, this
research has attempted to provide the perspective of the communities as a holistic body,
disagreements among members included. Thus, the concept of bricolage (Cleaver, 2012;
Rogers, 2012) can enhance the theory of effective and ineffective formal institutions
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) by expanding on the potential relationships within and
between institutions that are neither formal nor informal in the traditional sense such as is
often the case with indigenous communities. Additionally, this understanding can help to
identify certain patterns that could help to predict political changes in the future such as
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how the relationships between villages, locales, the central government, and international
mining companies will transform in future contexts.
In sum, these communities and villages consider their assemblies as important
institutions for the reproduction of knowledge and in the best interest of the democratic
participation in the decision-making process for the well-being of the community.
Furthermore, those rules can change depending on the context of the participants and
decision-making arrived at in the manner of consensus. They consider the assemblies as
the maximum authority, which enables them to solve any communal problem. In this
process, the theory of institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012) combined
with the theory of effective/ineffective formal/informal institutions (Pejovich, 1999;
Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) can help us to understand how the processes of organization
between these institutions function, what components can be modified and reused
according to certain circumstances, and to what degree the relationships between the
actors previously mentioned will be beneficial for all involved or not. Both communities
and their migrant communities have a dynamic organization that interconnects them.
These institutions are constantly changing and trying to maintain themselves meanwhile
customary components of their own rules and sociocultural norms are in flux. Their own
communal experience and customary way of managing their own institutions has helped
interconnect these communities allowing them to confront their challenges. The theory of
institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012) can help us to understand as a
holistic concept how formal and informal institutions can experience transformation.
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Land management
Customary forms of land management have direct influence on the customary
political organization (CPO) of these communities and vice versa. These communities’
form of CPO has been evolving through time and space until today alongside with land
and natural resource management. The rules and procedures designed by CPO are based
on the structure, function, reuse, implementation, and practice of customary land and
natural resource management. Both communities have similar resources and forms of
land management that have been maintained for millennia. Thus, CPO has had an
important influence on land and natural resources management. As the customary land
management has been maintained, reused, and implemented over time in different
historical contexts, it can help to identify patterns of practice of sustainable land
management that can share similarities with other ancient practices in other places. In
other words, if the community did not have control of their communally held land, the
type of political organization involved would have a different direction, structure,
procedure, and components. This type of land management that is still practiced in both
communities directly influences the way CPO was established.
Ostrom’s (2008) eight principles for managing common pool resources resonate
with the land management in both these communities. All the principles are practiced in
these communities. Here, we can analyze some of the most important principles that are
crucial to understand the importance of land management such as: the definite group
boundaries that are essential for the customary communities, rule-making by and for
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community members, recognition of these rules by outside authorities, and a system to
monitor and sanction offending members.
Define clear group boundaries
This first principle, according to the internal community statute, seems to be quite
clear with group boundaries very clearly explained. Within this statute there also appears
a process for accepting outsiders into the community as full members; however, these
new members need to agree to follow the rules and requirements of the community.
According to the rules of the statute people who want to be incorporated in the
community need to have the intention to work communally in the fields with no
commercial purpose. As a community leader explained, “When people come here, if they
are from another village and they want land to live on and work they will request this in
an assembly. Yes, they will provide it, but they must agree to follow the rules of the
community with taking advantage of the resources of the community.”
Rules by community members and for community members
The governing rules of the community that each member must follow are directly
related to the common goods in order to manage, organize and control the land and
society. These rules are agreed to by the people according to their necessities and
situational context. Thus, these rules can be constantly in a state of change over time.
Often rules are implemented, reformed, abandoned, and sometimes reused in the best
interest of the community, as the theory of bricolage suggests. Furthermore, aside from
the evolution of these rules not being static over time, they were also not created by a

151
small group in power, instead these rules are maintained by the constant participation of
all the members of the community. This not only provides members with ability to
change these rules to best fit their interest, but it also provides a platform for very real
direct democracy in plenitude over the decisions made about the communal rules.
Rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside
authorities
Both communities in this study are recognized by national law as peasant
communities that rely on their own autonomy and administration over the land. In these
processes of negotiation the stakeholders are the corporations, the state, and the
communities. The Peruvian government in 1993, in middle of a heated national debate
about land and resource rights, established that between the subsoil and the topsoil
(surface) the land belongs to the communities that have long been established there, but
below the subsoil, where most mined minerals are located, all resources officially belong
to the state. Today, this means that the state government of Peru has control of the subsoil
resources, while the topsoil resources are controlled and maintained by private and
community land owners. This controversial situation has added to conflicts between
external corporations, mostly mining and oil companies, and the indigenous people who
have lived in the places where these resources exist for millennia. Ultimately, the changes
wrought in 1993 by the state have made them the owners of everything in the subsoil and
below even if the surface of the land is owned as common property by the community
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(Amado, 2010). As the result of these differing rights and interests the mining operations
can lead to clientelism and manipulation.
System to monitor and sanction offending community members
As mentioned in the Results Chapter, the reciprocal community work such as ayni
and minka has been dramatically abandoned by certain segments of the communities due
to the mining operations. This has caused many changes to people’s behavior, including
economic changes and work habit changes due to the influence of mining. The principles
of common pool resource management (Ostrom, 1990) have thus been altered because of
outsiders coming to the village for work, eventual corruption of the authorities, and final
mistrust of the authorities by the community (See Table 15). The self-governance model
thus required by the assembly was strained and this caused difficulty in the maintenance
of community land management rules and norms. As evidenced by the conflict of
Parajinos detailed in the Results chapter.
The monitoring process, especially for land management, such as the use of a
camayok as described in the Literature Review Chapter, is used to check the behavior of
all community members and their belongings (e.g. animals, tools, water canals, etc.) as
they are used on the communal lands. If there are abuses, the offending member will be
sanctioned at the following village assembly. However, it is important to recognize that
through time the traditional authorities have lost much of their respect and their ability to
enforce and to organize and correct socially bad or impermissible behavior (e.g. theft,
abuse, cheating, etc.). These changes have been weakening the CPO rules and sanctions
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due to the inevitable influence of globalization, which allows connectivity of the villagers
and migrant communities to new ideas and technology. In just a short time these changes
have come to strongly influence village politics. Without any place of contestation or
time to reflect on what values of the sanctions, rules, and conditions are that need to be
maintained the question should be asked: how will land management change into the
future due to the pressures of neoliberalism and mining?
In sum, Ostrom’s common pool resource management principles fit well the
model of land management and political structure of the communities in this research.
However, these principles are changing rapidly in recent decades since the mining
operation in these areas and as the lack of the capacity of the State to recognize and
support communities has generated less trust and hope in the effectiveness of formal
institutions (See Table 15). Furthermore, through this research comes the question about
whether autonomous communities with communally held land can really exist into the
coming future age of expanded neoliberalism without any political, administrative, or
economic intervention by the government. Ostrom’s (2010) principles of polycentric
governance and microsituational level analysis can help to illuminate generally how
communities organize and manage their resources through building complex, interrelated,
trusting relationships among members. This concept of “trust” within the framework of
collective action theory is seen as highly important by Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom
(2010) and something the State needs to understand in order to recognize and include
these communities’ rules and norms in the management of these commons. However, in
States where the formal institutions of the government lack the capacity to regulate and
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control efficiently the resources and corporate responsibilities of international
communities, does the community then need to assume these responsibilities? What
requirements does the community need to do so?
Table 15: Five attributes (Ostrom 2010) applied to mining negotiations with villages
Attributes

Problem

Recommendations

Open
communication

Lack of
communication
between different
stake holders

Known
reputations

Lack of knowledge
of mining
companies’
operations

High marginal
per capita return

Canon minero

Long term vision

No plans for local
manufacturing, all
raw materials for
export

Sanctions system

Informal sanctions
often go
unrecognized by the
State

a) Affected communities’ (villages and
locales) opinions should be heard, valued,
and advocated for by the State when in
negotiation with mining companies.
b) State needs more effective formal
institutions to work with local communities
and regulate mining operations.
a) Encourage and facilitate the meeting of
community members from previous mining
operations when a new mine begins.
b) Create more comprehensive and publicly
available data on all mining operations in
the country and provide it to new mining
communities.
The canon minero should be reviewed for
unequal distribution based on proximity to
mine and economic status.
a) The State should implement laws that
methodically convert Peru’s mercantilist
economy into one of manufacturing,
requiring certain quantities of raw material
from foreign mining companies to be sold at
a near-cost value to Peruvian manufacturers.
b) Develop plans to maintain the traditional
agricultural lifestyle and geography of the
Andes as mining increases.
Develop further recognition of local
sanctions against mining companies to deter
abuses and conflict.
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Geographic Scale of Mining Consultation and CSR
The negotiation process of the mining operation requires stakeholders’
participation that is often coerced by political and economic influences. As a result, the
negotiation process relies on the favor of interest groups that often take advantage of this
process. Furthermore, this kind of negotiation can end up embroiled in conflict and
disagreement between different groups of interest. Thus, the communities are more
vulnerable, and all actors benefit less from these types of compromised processes. In
Muradian et al. (2003) the question is posed about the ideal geographic scale for mining
negotiation participation. In addition, they make the prediction that, “...any method for
decision making not relying mainly on local laypeople participation would likely prolong
conflicts across time, increasing the probability of local violent protests and weakening
local institutions” (Muradian et al. 2003, p. 790).
This thesis research agrees with Muradian et al. (2003) that it is vitally important
to consider primarily the views of villagers where the mine will be located. However, it
also suggests that secondarily the surrounding villagers from neighboring villages that
will be affected, and thirdly the locales from each of these villages that exists in the
major populated cities around Peru, but principally Lima, should also be consulted in this
process to assure “legitimized” acceptance of the outcome (Muradian et al. 2003). An
example of this is the difference between Calcauso’s and Mollebamba’s negotiation
processes with the mining companies.
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In Calcauso the negotiation process was difficult and strained, but because of the
accepted input of the village assembly, surrounding villages, and the migrant community
the final decision was agreed upon in the summer of 2017. This decision to allow the
first phase of exploration has largely been viewed as “legitimate”, even though some
people are still against the final decision as is evidenced by my research results. This,
while in Mollebamba only the village assembly was consulted, leaving out the secondary
circles (surrounding villages) and tertiary circles (locales) of influence and decisionmaking in the negotiation process. This resulted in not only a bad deal for Mollebamba,
but also the protest by surrounding villages at their assembly in 2008, and the land
conflict at Parajinos in 2014, all described in the Results Chapter. Each time these
conflicts appeared, Mollebamba had to halt the mining operations, consult with the
surrounding villages and their own locale in Lima, and renegotiate the contract with the
mine. This process took many years away from all the stakeholders’ time and efforts. It is
yet to be seen whether Calcauso’s negotiation will be longer-lasting than initial
negotiations by Mollebamba. However; the prospect of accepting input from secondary
and tertiary spheres of influence is a positive development.
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Chapter 6: Limitations, Future Research and Conclusion

As a member of these communities, I tried to develop a thesis that could give
practical suggestions to the current situation surrounding negotiation with the mining
companies. As a member of my community told me in the interview, the mining will
happen, it could be now or later, but it will come eventually because these resources
historically have been necessary for the society and industry. Many of them asked how I
could help them in this situation and I thought that a key element of future success in this
regard would be to first develop a greater understanding about their own political
organization and function and how these organizations negotiate with the mining
companies. This would then allow me to explore alternatives these communities might
have to negotiate more beneficial deals with mining companies in the future.

Limitations and Future Research
A limitation of this study was the lack of in-depth economic analysis of both
formal and informal institutions and how people benefit or not from current mining
policy. Because I did not obtain the raw financial records of profits, losses, and
investments of the mining companies in these areas, it is difficult to tell how favorable
these investments have been for them. Future economic research should focus on the
influence, appropriateness, and distribution of the canon minero (government tax on
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mining) because this was a principal point of discussion among authors (Arellano, 2008;
Zavalla, 2004; Hinojosa, 2011).
Future research must also expand its geographic scope. Until now, most research
has only focused on one or a handful of communities. A large-scale mixed-methods study
in the future that compares various factors among many communities affected by mining
would be extremely valuable for the field. In future, research could focus on health and
nutrition, educational and socioeconomic improvement, the generation and gender gap in
perspectives on mining and positions of authority in the communities, and the conditions
under which families continue working the land successfully after mining companies
arrive. These factors are important to analyze to understand and evaluate the significant
changes that are taking place in these communities because of neoliberal mining
practices.
Moreover, research in the future should pay particular attention to the standard of
living increase (or not) of communities affected by mining and the psychological pressure
to modernize to understand the cost-benefit of mining operations for these communities
(Norberg-Hodge, 1991). These types of studies are important because it is not yet clear
that the outcome of development through neoliberal mining practices will necessarily
ensure the well-being of the people and their socio-environmental context as compared
with their own CPO. These topics should be investigated further by various fields of
study to assure that the primary stakeholders, the villages and locales, are properly
benefitting from the use of their land and resources in this manner. Specifically, future
research needs to focus on unpacking the informal institutions of the indigenous
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communities and reconciling them with effective formal institutions to provide proper
CPR management that is accepted and administered by the local communities, especially
in situations like mining where extraction takes so much investment of money and labor.
If these major projects are going to happen either way, by following the attributes of
microsituations explained by Ostrom (2010), formal institutions could learn how to
properly incorporate local knowledge, authority, and decision-making within the
framework of their development projects, this will ensure a more complimentary
relationship between the informal and formal institutions of the region and thereby bring
more evenly widespread economic prosperity.
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Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to show the influence of customary political
organization (CPO) on the experiences of two indigenous Quechua communities as they
negotiated entry of mining operations onto their lands and into their communities. This
study utilized grounded theory and a mixed-methods approach to obtain relevant data,
and analyzed these data based on various theories and concepts by authors in the fields of
indigenous studies, political science, environmental science, geography, and ecology.
There were several main findings in this thesis. This included the unique structure of
CPO in these communities and the differences between villages in the negotiation
processes with mining companies. These negotiations and mining in general were
perceived differently according to the community demographics and impacted the
resulting mining negotiations. The results highlighted the need for recognition of local
knowledge and common pool resource (CPR) governance strategies by formal
institutions in order to help create more effective connections with informal institutions.
Of course, focusing on just increasing investments with a centralized state government
without having enough control and regulation can have devastating consequences. In the
Peruvian case, inefficiency of the State distribution programs for mining taxes makes the
canon minero (taxes) often increase social conflicts rather than decrease them in the long
term in the communities that are the most affected. These communities are in the first
stage of the mining operations and it was important to acknowledge in this research how
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and in which conditions mining arrived in these communities and how the political
organization of the community responded to these external actors through their
customary organization.
These findings in the current study relatively concurred with those of Pejovich
(1999) and Helmke and Levitsky (2004). This is in regard to the informal institutions and
their role under effective or ineffective governance by the State, however it was
important to add the concept of institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012) to
the analysis. Institutional bricolage suggested a more holistic approach to the
understanding of “informal” and “formal” institutions, and how the State in the case of
Peru could play a more active role in its protection and assistance to communities
negotiating with large multinational mining companies. Furthermore, these findings
identified the same four characteristics for indigenous peoplehood as suggested by
Thomas (1990) and Holm et al. (2003) to be existing in these communities, even though
the people there were largely unaware or misinformed about the word indigenous. Most
importantly, this study recognized that the migrants who are not currently living in their
traditional lands, but speak the Quechua language, participate in traditional festivities and
ceremonies, and are connected to traditional history, are also included in this model of
peoplehood. Ostrom’s (2008) eight principles for common pool resource management
were also found to be present in these villages. Six of the eight principles were elaborated
on while asking the question whether these communities need to assume a larger role in
regulating multinational mining companies arriving in their communities due to the
ineffective formal institutions of the State. Finally, in response to Muradian et al. (2003)
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this research has suggested that not only should the primary village (or villages) affected
by a mine be consulted in the negotiation process, but also the surrounding villages and
their migrant communities. This should help ameliorate potential problems, equalize the
benefits for all potential stakeholders, and ensure that after negotiations take place, there
is less conflict due to a higher amount of legitimization of the process. This is achieved
by including these important stakeholders as equal members at the negotiating table.
This comparative case study explained the context of the expansion of the mining
industry. Within the first phase of negotiation with the mining companies in these
villages, without even having started the operation yet, it already has created immense
social conflict. I highly suggest deeper study from the political comparative field to
understand in which conditions the formal and informal rules play an important role in
shaping their interaction with formal institutions, particularly focusing on the attributes of
CPR management (Ostrom, E., 2010). I also urge future research into the importance of
including migrant communities in some capacity at the negotiation table; in addition, the
importance of the political organization of the migrant communities in urban areas and
how they help shape the political structure in the village. This kind of network based
primarily on family ties has emerged as a strong modern political force. This is due to the
influence of migration and the self-determination and autonomy between villages and
locales. The way in which they have controlled and managed their resources have guided
them through their own ways of development throughout a long and challenging history.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Pearson Correlation Results for Village Survey SPSS Analysis
Dependent Variable

Ind. Variables

Pearson Correlation

Do you identify as
indigenous

Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever
lived in the city

0.283

Have you ever had a Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever
position of authority in lived in the city
the village?

0.328 | -.208

How often Do you
participate in the
village assembly

0.181

Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever
lived in the city

Last Question: Row 2 Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever
(Political Organization lived in the city
affects mining
negotiations)

0.21

Villagers should have Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever
more political authority lived in the city
than residents in Lima
over local politics

-0.165

Last Question: Row 3
(Residents should
participate in village
politics)

0.146 | -.165

Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever
lived in the city

Last Question: Row 7 Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever
(Village authorities
lived in the city
work for the interest of
the people))

0.13

Last Question Row 1
(Mining is a good
opportunity for the
community.

.153 | -.151

Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever
lived in the city

land titling is beneficial Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever
for the community
lived in the city

-0.217

Mining is the only form Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever
of development for the lived in the city
population

0.173

Mining causes social
divisions in the
community

.112 | -.115

Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever
lived in the city
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Appendix B: Pearson Correlation Results for Locale Survey SPSS Analysis
Dependent Variable

Ind. Variables

Pearson Correlation

Authorities work for
the benefit of the
village
12. If your answer is
yes, how often you
participate in
meetings or
gatherings of
residents?
14. Have you had a
position of authority in
the political
organization of
residents in the place
where you are
20. Choose whether
you 2 or 4 with the
following statements.
(9 alternative
answers) [The mining
operation is a good
opportunity for our
community]
Land Titling is
beneficial for the
community
Mine causes Social
divisions
Participation in village
assemblies

Gender, Age, Village of Origin

0.578

Gender, Age, Village of Origin

-0.545

Gender, Age, Village of Origin

-0.69

Gender, Age, Village of Origin

-0.292

Gender, Age, Village of Origin

.360 | .332

Gender, Age, Village of Origin

0.318

Gender, Age, Village of Origin

-0.41
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Appendix C: Random Partcipant List
Location: Research House Number: Location:

Research House Number:

Calcauso Interview

3 Mollebamba Interview

17

Calcauso Interview

12 Mollebamba Interview

18

Calcauso Interview

30 Mollebamba Interview

35

Calcauso Interview

38 Mollebamba Interview

61

Calcauso Interview

62 Mollebamba Interview

63

Calcauso Interview

66 Mollebamba Interview

93

Calcauso Interview

84 Mollebamba Interview

106

Calcauso Interview

86 Mollebamba Interview

112

Calcauso Interview

90 Mollebamba Interview

132

Calcauso Interview

95 Mollebamba Interview

138

Calcauso Interview

96 Mollebamba Interview

158

Calcauso Interview

103 Mollebamba Interview

161

Calcauso Interview

109 Mollebamba Interview

163

Calcauso Interview

121 Mollebamba Interview

182

Calcauso Interview

142 Mollebamba Interview

199

Calcauso Survey

1 Mollebamba Survey

9

Calcauso Survey

3 Mollebamba Survey

21

Calcauso Survey

5 Mollebamba Survey

28

Calcauso Survey

8 Mollebamba Survey

30

Calcauso Survey

9 Mollebamba Survey

31

Calcauso Survey

12 Mollebamba Survey

38

Calcauso Survey

15 Mollebamba Survey

39

Calcauso Survey

17 Mollebamba Survey

48

Calcauso Survey

19 Mollebamba Survey

56

Calcauso Survey

21 Mollebamba Survey

57

Calcauso Survey

23 Mollebamba Survey

58

Calcauso Survey

25 Mollebamba Survey

63

Calcauso Survey

27 Mollebamba Survey

68
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Location: Research House Number: Location:

Research House Number:

Calcauso Survey

30 Mollebamba Survey

69

Calcauso Survey

32 Mollebamba Survey

73

Calcauso Survey

34 Mollebamba Survey

77

Calcauso Survey

39 Mollebamba Survey

78

Calcauso Survey

46 Mollebamba Survey

81

Calcauso Survey

48 Mollebamba Survey

83

Calcauso Survey

50 Mollebamba Survey

86

Calcauso Survey

58 Mollebamba Survey

91

Calcauso Survey

60 Mollebamba Survey

94

Calcauso Survey

61 Mollebamba Survey

105

Calcauso Survey

63 Mollebamba Survey

106

Calcauso Survey

69 Mollebamba Survey

108

Calcauso Survey

70 Mollebamba Survey

117

Calcauso Survey

72 Mollebamba Survey

118

Calcauso Survey

74 Mollebamba Survey

119

Calcauso Survey

75 Mollebamba Survey

123

Calcauso Survey

81 Mollebamba Survey

126

Calcauso Survey

84 Mollebamba Survey

129

Calcauso Survey

87 Mollebamba Survey

132

Calcauso Survey

91 Mollebamba Survey

135

Calcauso Survey

92 Mollebamba Survey

136

Calcauso Survey

93 Mollebamba Survey

149

Calcauso Survey

102 Mollebamba Survey

150

Calcauso Survey

104 Mollebamba Survey

152

Calcauso Survey

110 Mollebamba Survey

155

Calcauso Survey

111 Mollebamba Survey

156

Calcauso Survey

115 Mollebamba Survey

157

Calcauso Survey

120 Mollebamba Survey

164

Calcauso Survey

121 Mollebamba Survey

168

181
Location: Research House Number: Location:

Research House Number:

Calcauso Survey

129 Mollebamba Survey

178

Calcauso Survey

131 Mollebamba Survey

180

Calcauso Survey

134 Mollebamba Survey

182

Calcauso Survey

136 Mollebamba Survey

183

Calcauso Survey

138 Mollebamba Survey

190

Calcauso Survey

139 Mollebamba Survey

194

Calcauso Survey

146 Mollebamba Survey

196

Calcauso Survey

148 Mollebamba Survey

198

182
Appendix D: National Statistical Service Sample Size Calculator

